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“I think it is in the best interests of America to support Israel . . . If America does not stand 
behind Israel we will pay the price for it” – Reverend Jerry Falwell (as quoted in Kreiter, 1981) 
 
The Jews are “spiritually blind and desperately in need of their Messiah and Savior” – Reverend 
Jerry Falwell (1981, 133) 
  
 
I. Introduction: Israel and Evangelicals 
 
The United States’ relationship with Israel is one of the country’s most important, 
strategically and symbolically.  The United States was the first country to recognize Israel 
(Nathanson & Mandelbaum, 2012), and ever since security and economic ties have bound the 
two nations closer together.  In the twenty-first century United States, it is unusual to find a 
serious presidential contender from either political party who does not at least pay lip service to 
this special relationship.  Despite his infamously frosty relationship with Israeli Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu (Freedman, 2012; Goldberg, 2015), President Barack Obama has discussed 
the special importance of supporting Israel’s security (Goldberg, 2012) and visited Israel as both 
presidential nominee and president (Zeleny, 2008; Greenberg & Wilson, 2012).  In the 2016 
presidential race, both major party nominees Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump professed their 
support for continuing a close relationship as well (Kopan & Labott, 2016; Schaefer, 2016).  
Since taking office, President Trump has affirmed his support for Israel, with an official White 
House website page reading: “President Trump stands in solidarity with Israel to reaffirm the 
unbreakable bond between our two nations and to promote security and prosperity for all” 
(“President Trump,” 2017). 
This relationship extends far beyond rhetoric and personal ties between political elites.  
The U.S. has for several decades annually supplied Israel with billions of dollars in military aid, 
and while economic aid is now in the millions instead of the billions, loan guarantees and free 
trade agreements keep the two countries closely linked (Nathanson & Mandelbaum, 2012).  
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American and Israeli military leaders have developed close ties through the sharing of ideas, 
strategies, and military hardware (Cohen, 2012).  The views of ordinary Americans and Israelis 
also reflect this special relationship.  The American public, recognizing Israel as a strategic 
partner and as a country that shares similar Western values, has long been sympathetic towards 
Israel in their disputes with Arab neighbors, and approved of American aid flowing to Israel 
(Cavari, 2012; “The American Public,” 2015).  Among Israelis, an astonishing 96 percent view 
relations with America as important or very important (Shalev, 2014). 
 Within the United States, a collection of individuals and interest groups work to sustain 
and influence this relationship.  As will be discussed later, these interest groups engage in a host 
of activities to win the attention of legislators and policymakers such as providing information, 
lobbying members of Congress, fundraising and contributing to political campaigns, and even 
endorsing politicians.  While united by a desire to secure the existence of Israel as a Jewish state, 
the lobby is rife with division (Waxman, 2012).  The American Israel Public Affairs Committee 
(AIPAC) is the most well-known of the interest groups, with thousands of members and millions 
of dollars in its budget, and belongs to the politically centrist part of the lobby (Waxman, 2012).  
AIPAC and groups similar to it work to build consensus among policymakers while neutralizing 
criticism of and opposition to the Israeli government’s policies within America (Waxman, 2012).  
Other interest groups exist that lean more liberal (J Street) or conservative (Zionist Organization 
of America), leading to an overall fractured movement with different groups favoring different 
policies and rhetoric.  Most of these interest groups draw primarily on the Jewish community 
within America for membership and resources (Waxman, 2012).  However, evangelical 
Protestants and interest groups associated with the Christian Right and Christian Zionism have 
also tried to play a significant role in the development of American-Israeli relations. 
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 The Christian Right is an umbrella term for a collection of interest groups and activists 
whose political conservatism originates in their Christian faith.  A significant majority of 
Christian Right members belong to theologically conservative evangelical Protestant 
denominations, and these same Protestants are the ones the Christian Right targets for political 
mobilization.  Drawing on their faith, these conservative Christians agitate for conservative 
social policy on everything from prayer in public schools to prescriptions on sexual behavior.  
While the Christian Right traces its roots to debates over evolution in schools in the early 20th 
century and anticommunist efforts in the 1950s and 60s, the movement gained steam and 
attention in the 1970s (Wilcox, 1992).  By this time, evangelicals were becoming more 
prominent in part simply because of demographics: evangelicals had more children than most 
other religious groups, and evangelical parents were relatively successful in keeping their 
children in their churches.  Conservative Christians also became more outspoken in response to 
the turmoil of the 1960s as the counterculture and debates over civil rights and Vietnam 
challenged traditional views in America.  A significant number of Americans concerned by this 
apparent moral decay and the Supreme Court decisions of the 1960s and early 1970s (which did 
everything from strike down state-sponsored prayer in public schools to legalize abortion) turned 
to faith for reassurance, and many found their religious home in theologically conservative 
congregations (Putnam & Campbell, 2010).  Early Christian Right leaders such as Jerry Falwell 
and Pat Robertson saw the potential to turn theological conservatives into political conservatives, 
and by the time of Reagan’s administration, groups like the Moral Majority were mobilizing 
conservative Christians to work on behalf of candidates and turn out voters who demanded social 
conservatism from their politicians. 
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 While the Christian Right typically finds itself battling over domestic policy, the leaders 
and interest groups do not neglect national security issues.  Some, such as Christians United for 
Israel (CUFI), are devoted to them.  Based on their long-rooted opposition to atheistic 
communism and the disproportionate number of evangelicals serving in the military, the 
Christian Right has pushed for and continues to push for a strong national defense (Wilcox, 
1992; McAlister, 2005; Wilcox & Robinson, 2011).  A key part of this foreign policy vision is an 
unwavering support for Israel.  In 2005, a Pew Research Center study found that white 
evangelical Protestants, compared to other Americans, were likelier to be sympathetic to Israel, 
cite their faith as the main reason behind their support, and believe that Israel fulfills part of 
prophecy concerning Christ’s return (“American Evangelicals,” 2005).  In a 2014 Pew Research 
Center study, evangelical Christians were likelier to believe that America is not doing enough to 
support Israel and were far more willing to support Israel if Israel were to attack Iran (Lipka, 
2014).  While conservative Christians do recognize the importance of bolstering a Western-
oriented democracy in the unstable Middle East, for a significant number a driving force behind 
their support is that the establishment and success of Israel as a state resonates with scripture and 
Biblically-based prophecies concerning the coming of Christ and the end-times.        
 The evangelical interest in Zionism and support for state of Israel finds much of its origin 
in the thought of John Nelson Darby, a 19th century evangelist responsible for the popularization 
of dispensationalism (Rubin, 2012).  Dispensationalists believe that, “God created a number of 
dispensations, or time periods, each of which creates a test for humans, which they inevitably 
fail” (Rubin, 2012, 237) until the end times ultimately arrive.  In order to bring about 
Armageddon and the triumph of Christ on Earth, the Jews must return to the Holy Land, rebuild 
the Temple, and begin again the rituals of sacrifice as found in the Old Testament (McAlister, 
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2005; Rubin, 2012).  Darby and his compatriots’ beliefs circulated quickly among theologically 
conservative Protestant pastors and theologians.  The 1878 Niagara Bible Conference included 
support for the creation of a Jewish state as a key belief, and a few decades late, C. I. Scofield 
published the Scofield Reference Bible (1909), a crucial text in the development of Christian 
fundamentalism that drew on dispensationalist thought (McAlister, 2005; Rubin, 2012).  Amstutz 
(2014) adds that non-dispensationalist evangelicals have biblical rationale to support Israel, too, 
as Jews are God’s chosen people, and those who care for Israel will receive blessings.   
 Armed with these beliefs and texts, conservative Christians began advocating in the first 
few decades of the twentieth century for the American government to support the creation of a 
Jewish state in Palestine.  This community celebrated the establishment of Israel in 1948 as a 
successful step towards the fulfillment of Biblical prophecy, but it was not until the late 1960s 
and early 1970s that Israel, as a player in both world affairs and Biblical prophecy, took center 
stage in the eyes of many evangelical Christians.  In 1967, Israel took total control over 
Jerusalem and several neighboring areas, defeating singlehandedly a coalition of its Arab 
neighbors in the Six-Day War.  Electrified by Israel’s military success and the taking of 
Jerusalem, prominent evangelicals like Jerry Falwell and Billy Graham became intrigued by 
Israel (McAlister, 2005), And while evangelical elites took note, the 1970 publishing of Hal 
Lindsey’s The Late Great Planet Earth provided a text that synthesized Biblical prophecy and 
current events in a way that emphasized Israel’s centrality to the return of Christ (Lindsey, 1970; 
McAlister, 2005).  Sold by the millions (McAlister, 2005), this book galvanized the evangelical 
community from the 1970s on to look to Israel as a guarantor of Christ’s return.      
 However, the evangelical interest in Israel is not without tension, which makes this 
relationship even more striking.  While the return of Christ demands the establishment of a 
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Jewish state, the Jews’ place in Christ’s return is uncertain.  For many conservative Christians, 
salvation is impossible without accepting Christ as one’s savior, leaving Jews presumably to find 
themselves as part of the damned (McAlister, 2005).  Leaders of evangelical Protestantism and 
the Christian Right, even if avowedly supportive of Israel, have also made insensitive comments 
concerning Jews.  In 1980, the president of the Southern Baptist Convention, Bailey Smith, told 
a group of pastors that: “God Almighty does not hear the prayer of a Jew” (quoted in McAlister, 
2005, 176).  Christian Coalition founder and presidential candidate Pat Robertson said Jews do 
not fully understand anti-Semitism: “The poor Jews don’t understand that, it’s too cosmic for 
most of them to grasp, especially because they don’t believe Jesus is the Messiah” (as quoted in 
Vamburkar, 2012).  Even Christian United For Israel (CUFI) founder John Hagee has made 
statements implying that Jews are at fault for anti-Semitism because of their disobedience to 
God, and that the Holocaust was part of God’s plan to drive Jews to Israel (Blumenthal, 2007a; 
Yglesias, 2008).  At best insensitive, these comments showcase how unusual in some sense the 
support of evangelical Protestants for Israel is.  Theology instructs these conservative Christians 
to support Israel as a way to mirror God’s love for the Jewish people and as a prerequisite to the 
return of Christ, yet the same theology often promotes an exclusive message concerning who 
will benefit from the return, and the Jews often seem to be left out. 
 In this paper, I examine how Christian Right leaders, their interest groups, and the 
evangelical Protestant faith of decision-makers (whether they be presidents or party leaders) have 
shaped American support for Israel since the late 1970s when these interest groups blossomed.  I 
proceed by examining the changing treatment of Israel in presidential campaigns and party 
platforms, and whether or not belonging to an evangelical Protestant denomination makes a 
member of Congress more likely to support pro-Israeli policy.  I find that in these areas the 
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evangelical and Christian Right footprint to be very small.  In GOP primary campaigns, 
evangelicals are not more likely than non-evangelicals to bring up Israel on their own initiative 
in debates, and among those who do talk about Israel, their rhetoric is not noticeably more 
intense.  Candidates seeking Christian Right support are more likely to criticize or say nothing 
about Israel than candidates uninterested in such support.  Until the 2016 platform, no evidence 
exists explicitly linking the Christian Right to changes in Israel-related language, and this 
language has neither consistently grown nor become more effusive since 1980.  Analysis of the 
1981 vote to sell AWACS to Saudi Arabia and the 2015 vote on the Iran nuclear deal shows that 
a member’s evangelicalism does not have a consistent, statistically significant relationship with 
how the member votes, and the model actually indicates that, if anything, evangelicals are more 
likely to vote for the anti-Israel position than non-evangelicals. 
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II.  Interest Groups, Religion, and American Foreign Policy: The Literature 
 This paper’s central question is informed by and contributes to two different academic 
literatures.  The first is how interest groups affect American foreign policy.  Scholars and the 
media have traditionally focused on their effect on domestic-oriented policies such as healthcare 
reform or banking regulation.  Less attention has been paid to how interest groups affect 
American foreign policy, and whether or not interest groups focusing on foreign policy use 
similar strategies as those who focus on domestic policy.  The second literature considers how 
religion affects American foreign policy.  Religion is a powerful force in American politics, but 
again much of the focus on religion’s effects has been on domestic policies, especially on social 
policies such as abortion and gay rights.  In examining how the Christian Right has affected 
American policy towards Israel, and Israel’s treatment as a political issue, I will add to both these 
literatures.           
Interest Groups and Foreign Policy in America 
Interest groups are “any non-party organization that engages in political activity” 
(Nownes, 2013, 4). They operate on all levels of American government, from federal to 
municipal, on both political and policy fronts.  An enduring part of the American political 
landscape is the presence of interest groups, and in the latter half of the twentieth century the 
number of interest groups in America has exploded, with such organizations now numbering in 
the hundreds of thousands (Berry & Wilcox, 2007; Nownes, 2013).   
 Once interest groups form, they may choose to participate in a wide variety of activities 
to achieve their political and policy goals.  Organizational maintenance, monitoring the 
government, and self-governing are crucial to interest group survival (Berry & Wilcox, 2007; 
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Nownes, 2013).  Secure finances and stable membership are two prerequisites for a viable 
interest group, and interest groups cannot ignore these necessities, especially when they often 
compete with other groups (Gray & Lowery, 1997).  Once viable, interest groups may then move 
on to attempt to influence the government.  For the purpose of this review, I will focus on 
interest group activity on the national level because virtually all meaningful American policy 
concerning Israel occurs on this level.   
Scholars commonly divide the activities of interest groups between insider strategies and 
outsider strategies (also referred to as direct and indirect lobbying).  Insider or direct strategies 
involve interest group activity in which lobbyists develop close working relationships with 
policymakers through activities like providing information or engaging in drafting processes of 
bills or bureaucratic regulations.  Interest groups employ outsider or indirect strategies when they 
manipulate media coverage, engender grassroots activity on behalf of their issues, or become 
active in the electoral process (Bibby, 1994; Ginsberg, 1997; Thomas, 2004; Coleman et al., 
2009; Hall & Reynolds, 2012).  Groups attempting to defend the status quo tend to be less active 
than those challenging it, and all are carefully attuned to watching whether or not a policy may 
change.  Overall these strategies cover a wide array of tactics, and interest groups tend to use 
inside strategies (especially maintaining close contact with legislative allies) more than they do 
outside, because the former tend to better achieve tangible results (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998; 
Baumgartner et al., 2009).      
In considering forms of direct lobbying, perhaps the most popular image of interest group 
activity is that of lobbyists walking the halls of Capitol Hill and persuading members of 
Congress to vote a certain way on a bill.  However, it is far more likely to find interest groups 
providing information than engaging in arm-twisting.  When dealing with lawmakers, lobbyists 
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hope that by proposing action, or by detailing how already-proposed actions will affect the 
political, policy, or legal landscape, they can persuade them to engage in various activities 
ranging from amending legislation to holding hearings to intervening with executive agencies 
(Coleman et al., 2009; Nownes, 2013).  It should be emphasized that in lobbying Capitol Hill, 
organized interests do not focus only on changing the votes of legislators.  For example, Hall and 
Wayman (1990) find that moneyed interests are more successful in buying “the marginal time, 
energy, and legislative resources that committee participation requires” (814), and in an 
environment where legislators’ attentions and resources are divided between many different 
issues, this itself can be powerful.     
Some division exists within the literature on whom lobbyists choose to lobby.  Several 
scholars argue that interest groups concentrate most on mobilizing legislators who already agree 
with their position, instead of those who are undecided or hostile (Hojnacki & Kimball, 1998; 
Hojnacki & Kimball, 1999; Hall & Reynolds, 2012).  Hall and Deardorff (2006) argue that 
lobbying can be thought of as a legislative subsidy in which lobbyists provide information or 
labor to chiefly help “natural allies” (69) that will continue to support their causes.  Nevertheless, 
Hojnacki and Kimball (1999) do find that if an interest group has strong ties to a legislator’s 
constituency, then they will lobby them no matter the legislator’s initial policy preference.   
When lobbying Congress, interest groups tend to focus on members of the committees that 
oversee pertinent legislation, concentrating not only on members of Congress but their staff and 
the committee staff, too (Berry & Wilcox, 2007; Baumgartner et al., 2009; Nownes, 2013).   
The ability of interest groups to provide highly technical information is not to be 
underestimated.  Lawmakers must consider and vote on pieces of legislation that they have very 
little personal interest in, and that are unlikely to affect their electoral future.  The information 
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that interest groups may provide to lawmakers comes in several forms: they might share the 
policy ramifications of one’s vote on a piece of legislation such as if the legislation will curb 
fossil fuel emissions or promote job growth in a certain industry; they might share the political 
ramifications of supporting or opposing the legislation, and how it could bolster or imperil their 
party’s electoral success; or they could share the legal ramifications of a bill such as whether or 
not the legislation would likely hold up in court (Hall & Deardorff, 2006; Coleman et al., 2009; 
Baumgartner et al., 2009; Nownes, 2013).     
Interest group lobbyists may go even farther than trying to sell a bill to a skeptical or 
indifferent lawmaker.  Writing legislation is a time-consuming task, and lobbyists may volunteer 
to help draft bills or provide certain pieces of language on behalf of lawmakers (Bibby, 1994; 
Grant, 2004; Nownes, 2013).  Lawmakers now have time to focus on presumably more pressing 
issues for themselves, while interest group agents can help draft the bill to make it as appealing 
as possible both for their own members and supportive lawmakers.  For example, some language 
in recent finance-related legislation is almost exactly identical to suggestions from Citigroup 
(Chang, 2013; Eichelberger 2013). As Congress cuts staff, it is increasingly likely that lobbyists 
will become involved in writing legislation in all issue areas (Madonna & Ostrander, 2015).    
In less personal encounters, lobbyists may testify at congressional hearings in order to 
guarantee some “facetime” with legislators and garner publicity for their issues (Berry & Wilcox, 
2007; Baumgartner et al., 2009).  Even if a lobbyist is unable to make it to a congressional 
hearing in person, he or she may submit a written statement (Nownes, 2013).  By engaging in 
these various activities, with the ultimate goal of shaping the text of legislation and then forming 
coalitions to break or generate congressional gridlock (depending on an interest group’s position 
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on a bill), interest groups play an important and highly visible role in shaping the fate of 
congressional legislation (Bibby, 1994; Berry & Wilcox, 2007; Victor, 2012).     
Interest groups certainly do not restrict themselves to lobbying the legislative branch.  
Lobbying the executive branch is an important part of any interest group’s activity, particularly 
for foreign policy.  The executive branch recognizes the importance of these relationships: in 
1970, President Nixon established the Office of Public Liaison (now the Office of Public 
Engagement and Intergovernmental Affairs) to facilitate communication with interest groups.  
The Office allows interest groups to share their priorities with the president while simultaneously 
making themselves available to potentially aid the president in activities like outreach or 
coalition-building (Peterson, 1992; Bibby, 1994; Nownes, 2013).  The executive branch budget 
process is one area of particular concern for interest groups as they look to maintain or increase 
funding for their priorities (Coleman et al., 2009).  In addition to lobbying the White House, 
interest groups also reach out to the bureaucratic agencies responsible for implementing public 
policy.  Interest groups are able to make their voices heard by meeting with bureaucrats and by 
submitting comments on the rule-making process (Ginsberg et al., 1997; Berry & Wilcox, 2007; 
Baumgartner et al., 2009).  Additionally, interest group representatives may have the opportunity 
to sit on advisory committees where they can provide technical information and help set the 
agency’s agenda (Ginsberg et al., 1997; Nownes, 2013).  Organized interests may also move 
most aggressively by suing agencies in attempts to gain injunctions, or to try to force them to 
move more quickly in implementation (Bibby, 1994; Ginsberg et al., 1997).  
Organized interests also use outsider or indirect strategies to advance their missions, 
especially when they lack access to decision makers.  While Washington, D.C. may seem to be 
the heart of interest group activity, involvement of interest groups in grassroots organizing and 
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elections across the country can drastically shape certain issues.  By informing legislators’ 
constituencies of certain issues and convincing these constituencies to make their voices heard, 
interest groups can increase the number of voices arguing for their position and more effectively 
tie a legislator’s decision to her political future (Loomis, 2004; Berry & Wilcox, 2007).  Interest 
groups often begin the process of grassroots lobbying by reaching out to their own members and 
directing them to flood their elected official’s offices with phones calls and mail, a process 
derided by some as “Astroturf” lobbying (Ginsberg et al., 1997; Coleman et al., 2009).   
Organized interests also may create and air media designed to capture the attention of decision 
makers and their constituents.  An oft-cited example is the Harry and Louise ad campaign 
launched by the Health Insurance Association of America in opposition to President Clinton’s 
health reform legislation.  These ads generated an immense amount of free media, and prompted 
hundreds of thousands of citizens to contact their representatives.  Legislators were then forced 
to respond to the particular concerns brought up in the ad (Coleman et al., 2009; Hall & 
Reynolds, 2012).  A more recent example comes from the Club for Growth, a conservative 
interest group that works to cut taxes and government spending, which aired advertisements in 
certain districts prior to a vote on reauthorizing the Export-Import Bank (Min Kim, 2015).  The 
Club let these representatives know that it was monitoring the upcoming vote and drew their 
constituents’ attention to it.  Beyond generating media coverage and constituent contact, interest 
groups can also train and organize activists.  For example, the group Americans for Prosperity, 
dedicated to reducing the size of American government, has spent money to educate and 
organize Tea Party activists in order to create and maintain a grassroots presence in states across 
the country (Mayer, 2010).  
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Interest groups can go beyond mobilizing constituent contact to getting involved directly 
in elections.  The explosion in the number of interest groups over the past few decades has been 
accompanied by an increase in interest group spending in the political arena (Nownes, 2013).  
And some of these resources find their way into electoral politics as interest groups hope to help 
rising and established allies while defeating officials who oppose them.  Contributions through 
political action committees are a common and relatively transparent form of financial support, 
but “soft money” spending by interest groups, independent of parties or candidates, is 
increasingly popular (Hrebrenar, 2004; Coleman et al., 2009; Cigler, 2012; Nownes, 2013).  
Interest groups may also distribute voter guides, endorse candidates, and host voter registration 
drives (Shaiko, 2004; Berry & Wilcox, 2007; Nownes, 2013).  They may even impact the banner 
under which these candidates run through influencing the substance of party platforms (Baer & 
Bositis, 1988; Fine, 1994; Shaiko, 2004).  The Club for Growth is not shy about endorsing 
favored candidates, and in the past few election cycles has spent millions of dollars in districts to 
elect allies and defeat opponents with varying success (Catanese, 2010; Sugden, 2014).  These 
millions are of course only a drop in the bucket of all the money interest groups spend in giving 
to candidates and waging their own political fights.   
 As seen in the above examples of interest group activity, news media and scholarship 
tend to focus on how interest groups affect domestic politics and policymaking.  Interest group 
influence on foreign policy has been relatively ignored, partially because many scholars doubt 
whether interest groups even have influence on American foreign policy.  A Cold War viewpoint 
in early studies emphasized that the executive branch dominated foreign policy, and was less 
accessible to interest group pressure than was Congress (Cohen, 1959).  More recently, Spanier 
and Uslaner argue that the president is relatively isolated from interest group pressure when it 
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comes to foreign policy decisions.  Bureaucrats and advisors are the inner circle, and when 
international crises demand immediate action there is no time to consult interest groups (Spanier 
& Uslaner, 1982; Snider, 2004).  But to characterize American foreign policy as simply 
dominated by an executive who bounces from split-second decision to split-second decision in 
the face of sudden crises would be a mistake.  Whether it is dealing with Iran’s nuclear program 
or working with Russia on armament control, foreign policy forces the executive branch to 
devise strategy and negotiate with international actors and other branches of the American 
government.  As foreign policy decision making has become more diffused overall (Dietrich, 
1999), interest groups have worked with varying success to impact these decisions in multiple 
ways.      
  Dietrich (1999) writes that when it comes to foreign policy, interest groups play three 
primary roles, which are similar to those used when it comes to domestic policy: (1) they frame 
issues in ways that shape the terms of debate (2) they help Congress monitor international events 
and the ways in which the executive branch responds to them; and (3) they provide information 
to government officials and lawmakers.  I will consider these roles, and others in which foreign 
policy-focused interest groups are increasingly involved.     
 Similar to domestic-oriented interest groups, foreign policy-focused groups often use 
insider strategies.  In the 1980s, the Cuban-American National Foundation (CANF) was active in 
engaging Capitol Hill on Cuban and other Latin American issues.  CANF helped to repeal the 
Clark Amendment, which banned American aid from flowing to private Angolan military or 
paramilitary groups (Haney & Vanderbush, 1999).  Unhappy with the Cuban regime sending 
troops to Angola, CANF leaders began informing U.S. lawmakers about why they should 
support repealing the Clark Amendment, and the ramifications of doing so.  Leaning on 
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lawmakers who had been sympathetic to their previous causes, CANF helped convince Congress 
to repeal the amendment in 1985 (Haney & Vanderbush, 1999).   
 Interest groups have also attempted to influence the executive branch.  Early on in the 
Clinton administration, concerns over Chinese human rights violations led to debate over 
whether or not China deserved Most Favored Nation (MFN) status for trade.  Interest groups that 
favored America taking a stronger stance against human rights abuses (Human Rights Watch) 
got involved as did business-minded organizations (the U.S.-China Business Council).  Both 
sides scheduled meetings with key administration officials, and Clinton administration officials 
even reached out to human rights groups for information (Broder & Mann, 1994; Dietrich, 
1999).  Interest groups continued to be active on American foreign policy towards China during 
the Obama administration as well.  For example, before one of President Obama’s visits to 
China, he received a letter signed by groups like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the 
National Association of Manufacturers, pushing him to take stronger stances against China’s 
technology protectionism (Martina, 2015).   
Interest groups dedicated to foreign policy issues have used outside strategies, too.  In the 
lead-up to the American invasion of Iraq, several organized interests arose to oppose the policy.  
Groups such as Not In Our Name and Americans Against the War With Iraq placed 
advertisements in major newspapers arguing against the war, and reserved time for television 
ads, too (Campbell, 2002; Ives, 2003).  Interest groups supportive of the war used similar 
strategies.  For example, several years after the invasion, Freedom’s Watch ran television ads 
throughout the country to engender grassroots support and pressure Congress to continue 
allocating resources to support the surge (Tapper & Miller, 2007).  During the Obama 
administration, Citizens for a Nuclear Free Iran, a group that opposed the recent Iran nuclear 
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deal, raised tens of millions of dollars to spend in television ads to pique the interest of 
constituents and draw the attention of lawmakers (Ho, 2015).   
 Christian Right interest groups and their leaders have employed all of these afore-
mentioned techniques in their attempts to influence American politics and policy, although 
studies of them usually focus on their efforts in domestic policy.  In terms of D.C. lobbying, 
Christian Right leaders and interest groups have long had the ears of the Capitol Hill politicians 
and White House insiders.  In the 1990s, the Christian Coalition’s Ralph Reed advised fellow 
Christian Right leaders to broaden their conservative message.  Instead of focusing solely on 
social conservatism, he pushed for an embrace of Newt Gingrich’s “Contract with America,” 
despite the fact that it neglected issues like abortion and gay rights.  By supporting such policy 
platforms and helping almost any leading Republican candidates (even those with questionable 
social conservative credentials), Reed generated goodwill between the Coalition and Republican 
leadership in the hopes of winning favor for the Christian Coalition’s “Contract with the 
American Family” (Brownstein, 1995; Stan, 1995; Waldron, 1995; Green, 2004; Williams, 
2010).  Focus on the Family’s James Dobson, using a more aggressive strategy in his dealings 
with Congress, threatened publicly to leave the Republican Party due to socially conservative 
policies languishing in Congress.  Efforts to placate him by congressional leaders like Dick 
Armey and Tom Delay, and by House social conservatives, led to votes on social conservative 
issues and the establishment of the Values Action Team to promote dialogue between Christian 
Right leaders and political leadership (Gilgoff, 2008; Williams, 2010).   President George W. 
Bush also leaned on Christian Right leaders to offer initial support for his Supreme Court 
nominee Harriet Myers before her nomination fell through (Babington & Fletcher 2005; 
Williams 2010).   
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The Christian Right is no stranger to grassroots mobilization and making their voices 
heard through the electoral process.  In past presidential elections, Christian Right leaders and 
their interest groups have not been shy in making endorsements (Williams, 2010; Eckholm, 
2012; S. Smith, 2015a; S. Smith, 2015b; S. Smith 2016).  Additionally, these groups regularly 
engage in voter mobilization, the distribution of voter guides, and other forms of political 
engagement to bring voters to the polls (Eggen & Somashekhar, 2012; Kroll, 2012; Guth & 
Bradberry, 2013).  While the Christian Right maintains an active presence in the American 
political landscape, attention paid to the Christian Right usually focuses on how they affect 
domestic policy.  But the Christian Right has always favored a strong national defense policy, 
rooted in their opposition to atheistic communism (Clendinen, 1980; Wilcox, 1992).  Part of this 
foreign policy outlook includes strong support for Israel.  
Academic scholarship and media attention rarely go beyond cursory mentions of the 
Christian Right interest groups’ interest in Israel (Woolridge, 2008; Waxman, 2010).  Some 
scholars (Wood, 2007; Bach, 2010) have commented on the annual gatherings of Christians 
United for Israel (CUFI), but more attention is needed.  CUFI, founded in 2006 by evangelical 
pastor John Hagee, is the most visible Christian Zionist group and claims over three million 
members, making it the nation’s largest pro-Israel advocacy group (“Christians United,” 2016).  
In their relatively short period of existence, CUFI has become a fundraising powerhouse.  Just in 
their first four years, CUFI raised tens of millions of dollars for charitable purposes as varied as 
flak jackets for Israeli soldiers to bomb shelters for Israeli communities (Rubin, 2010), and their 
operational budget is in the millions (Guttman, 2010).  In their mission statement, CUFI says that 
it exists to educate America’s Christians about the “Biblical imperative” of supporting Israel, and 
to move policy in a pro-Israel direction through communicating with lawmakers and mobilizing 
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their members to do the same (“Christians United,” 2016).  CUFI holds events each month 
across the country, ranging from events to show support for Israel to sessions for ministry and 
pastoral leaders to learn about how they can spread the message through their congregations 
(“Standing with,” 2016; “Pastors’ Briefing,” 2016).  Their annual summit in Washington draws 
thousands of activists and over the years has featured messages delivered from Netanyahu and 
prominent American politicians such as Joe Lieberman, Lindsay Graham, and Tom Delay 
(Blumenthal, 2007b; Black, 2014).  Additionally, 2015 saw the establishment of the CUFI 
Action Fund.  This organization, headed by prominent CUFI member Gary Bauer, works 
exclusively on legislative and political issues, with a reported budget of millions of dollars 
(Rubin, 2015).   
 While CUFI might be the most visible among Christian Right interest groups, when it 
comes to Israel, it does not stand alone.  Concerned Women for America (CWA), one of the 
best-organized Christian Right interest groups on the national stage (Wilcox & Robinson, 2011), 
includes support for Israel as one of its seven core issues (“Support for Israel,” 2016).  Citing 
Bible verses, CWA pledges to work for laws and policies that strengthen the American-Israeli 
relationship (“Support for Israel,” 2016).  CWA can also bring significant resources to bear in 
influencing policy.  Besides its extensive grassroots network, in fiscal year 2014 CWA reported 
5 million dollars in revenue, over 800 thousand dollars in assets, and 21 employees (Concerned 
Women for America).  Their associated Concerned Women for America Legislative Action 
Council reported almost 700 hundred thousand dollars in revenue, and roughly 70 thousand in 
assets (Concerned Women for America Legislative Action Council). The Family Research 
Council (FRC), another prominent Christian Right interest group, is headed by Tony Perkins, 
who has led FRC-sponsored tours of Israel (“Tony Perkins,” 2014) and has said that the 
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American-Israeli relationship must “always remain unshakable and Bible-believing Christians 
must do their part” (as quoted in “FRC’s Perkins,” 2015).  The Family Research Council (FRC) 
coordinates extensive national and state lobbying with grassroots efforts, and focuses on 
influencing policy discussion by providing information to sympathetic politicians and activists 
(Wilcox & Robinson, 2011).  They also have an affiliated organization, Family Research Council 
Action, that issues voter guides, endorses candidates, and oversees a political action committee 
(Family Research Council Action).  In fiscal year 2014, the FRC reported revenue of 15 million 
dollars, assets of over 5 million dollars, and almost 100 employees (Family Research Council).  
Family Research Council Action reported additional revenue of nearly three million dollars and 
over 200 thousand dollars in assets (Family Research Council Action).  While Israel is not one of 
the FRC’s key issues, it is one more supportive voice in the Christian Right movement that 
commands significant resources.  Led by CUFI, the Christian Right overall has the potential 
interest and resources to advance pro-Israel policies.       
Religion and American Foreign Policy 
 Observers have long noted the distinct religiosity of Americans, with de Tocqueville 
reporting back to his fellow Europeans how the Christian faith flourished in 19th century 
America (Graebner, 1976).  The importance of faith to Americans has not diminished much, and 
in comparison to other similarly developed Western countries, Americans are outliers in how 
much faith matters to them (Wike, 2016).  It is no surprise then that politicians regularly discuss 
their own faith (Killough 2015; Chozick, 2016), and that religious justifications often make their 
way into arguments over everything from healthcare policies to gay rights to military conflict.   
 Coleman et al. (2009) write that a set of beliefs, the American Creed, makes up the 
dominant American political culture through which most Americans evaluate issues and 
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politicians (see also Huntington, 2004).  The importance of religion in America since colonial 
times has shaped and been a key part of this American political culture.  Wald (1992) argues that 
Puritan beliefs shaped the beliefs of the founders.  For example, the belief that God and mortals 
have a contractual relationship shaped the interest in creating a social contract between state and 
citizen, and the belief that God influences individuals’ daily lives can easily lead to the belief 
that God guides a nation (Wald, 1992).  Additionally, several scholars note the existence of a 
civil religion in the United States.  Americans use religion to frame and understand the country’s 
history and purpose, applying religious references and moralistic criteria to political and policy 
discussions (Bellah, 1967; Wald, 1992; Corbett & Corbett, 1999).         
 Americans are quite comfortable with politicians discussing their faith and religious 
leaders discussing their politics.  Examples that blur these lines include Jesse Jackson, an 
ordained minister, who ran for the Democratic nomination for president twice and regularly 
appealed to religion as the foundation for his political principles (Hatch, 1989).  On the other 
side of the political spectrum, another ordained minister, Pat Robertson, sought the Republican 
nomination for president in 1988, and ran on a strong socially conservative platform (Wilcox, 
1992).  Even politicians who are less explicitly connected to religion, such as President Obama, 
have discussed how their faith has impacted their policy preferences (Tau, 2012; Jaffe, 2015).   
Religious leaders without pretensions to office make their voices heard, too.  For example, the 
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops has made statements on everything from nuclear 
arms to immigration reform to the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate (Hanna, 1989; 
“Bishops Renew,” 2012; “Catholic Church's,” 2013).  Some pastors endorse favored candidates, 
and some churches work to turn out their parishioners’ vote (Saulny, 2012; “More than,” 2015; 
C. Smith, 2016; D. Smith, 2016).      
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 Periodically, religion has also affected policy decisions.  The Christian Right successfully 
pushed for a 1985 Education Department regulation that forbade “local school districts from 
using certain federal funds to support courses in ‘secular humanism’” (Wald, 1992, 263).  Early 
on in the George W. Bush administration, President Bush, drawing on his own Christianity, used 
executive orders to support faith-based initiatives (typically in the form of the government 
allocating public money to religiously-affiliated organizations that provide social services) and 
by prohibiting government agencies from discriminating against religious groups applying for 
funding (Williams, 2010).  Arguments in the name of protecting religious freedom have been 
used to protest everything from compliance with the Affordable Care Act to pass religious liberty 
laws that allow businesses to refuse services if doing so conflicts with their faith, and to restrict 
federal funds being used for abortion and Planned Parenthood (Callahan, 2015; Scott, 2015; 
Russell-Kraft, 2016)  
 Religious appeals have often been focused on domestic policy, but their effect on foreign 
policy deserves further attention.  Foreign policy is “the policy of a state towards external actors 
and especially other states” (Diez et al., 2011, 58; Alden & Aran, 2012).  Over the past several 
decades, scholars have advanced several theories as to how states set their foreign policies. 
 A few schools of thought leave little room for religion to affect a state’s foreign policy.  
Rational choice theory posits that within foreign policy decision-making, states act as unitary 
actors and the domestic characteristics of the state – for example, the religiosity of its citizenry – 
do not play a large role in setting foreign policy preferences and choices (Alden & Aran, 2012).  
Another school of thought emphasizes the importance of larger organizational processes and 
bureaucratic politics in setting foreign policy.  Organizations and bureaucracies prioritize their 
own survival and expansion above all else, no matter the detrimental effects this may have on 
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policy outcomes.  In order to act more efficiently, these large organizations create standard 
operating procedures that allow them to act quickly, yet also hinder innovation and creative 
responses to world events that may demand nuance.  The idiosyncrasies of individual and 
groups, including religious motivations, may be partially neutralized, when these larger entities 
shape the initial contours of discussion (Hudson, 2007; Alden & Aran, 2012).  Examples of 
important scholarly work that take this approach include Allison’s (1971) study on the Cuban 
missile crisis and Halperin’s (1974) study of mid-twentieth century American defense 
policymaking. 
   Psychological and behavioral explanations of foreign policy decision-making arose to 
counter rational choice theory.  It is hard to believe that a state is a unitary actor when it comes to 
foreign policy decision-making when one sees the number of individuals in the executive and 
legislative branches of the American government who have some say over foreign policy 
decision-making and implementation.  These explanations argue that individuals are at the heart 
of decision-making, and in times of high stress and uncertainty, understanding the psychological 
and behavioral characteristics and perceptions of individuals is an important layer to evaluate in 
foreign policy analysis (Hill, 2003; Hudson, 2007; Alden & Aran, 2012).  Religious beliefs and 
the way they may shape one’s perceptions of the world, and one’s policy priorities can thus play 
an important role, according to this school of thought.    
 Other scholars have emphasized working on the importance of culture and national 
identity in foreign policy decision-making.  It is within this school of thought that investigations 
of how religion affects foreign policy might also find its home.  As mentioned previously, 
scholars have paid attention to how the characteristics of individuals affect their decision-
making, but it is also crucial to understanding how the cultural and national environment has 
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shaped their political socialization and psychology (Hudson, 2007).  However, attributing foreign 
policy decisions to cultural influences can be problematic.  It is hard to falsify the hypothesis that 
culture affects foreign policy, as everything humans do “becomes both a product of and a 
component of culture” (Hudson 2007, 107).  Scholars have thus taken a different tack in 
understanding the relationship between culture and foreign policy by examining how culture is 
used as a political instrument.  Actors can manipulate cultural narratives to encourage other 
actors and the larger populace to make certain decisions (McAlister, 2005; Hudson, 2007).  The 
religious character of a nation can be an important element in a nation’s culture and national 
identity, and narratives based in or informed by faith can be used to justify certain foreign policy 
prescriptions.  Elites who take to heart their faiths’ moral codes may attempt to project those 
codes abroad through their foreign policy, and may be particularly attuned to other actors that 
share their faith or are especially hostile towards it (Hill, 2003; McAlister, 2005).  Amstutz 
(2014) adds that moral principles, often supplied by religion, provide foreign policy goals, 
standards for judging one’s actions and the actions of other international actors, and inspiration 
for foreign policy action.        
One landmark work that delves into the importance of religion overall in understanding 
foreign policy and international relations is Huntington’s 1996 book The Clash of Civilizations 
and the Remaking of World Order.  Huntington (1996) argues that differences between 
civilizations will be the primary causes of strife in the post-Cold War world.  Some of the 
civilizations he identifies are marked first and foremost by their religious character, such as an 
Islamic civilization, a Hindu one, and an Orthodox one. “Religion is a central defining 
characteristic of civilizations” (Huntington, 1996, 47).  Religion thus colors the foreign policy of 
states, and Huntington (1996) especially focuses on how majority Muslim states have justified 
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their foreign policy decisions by appealing to Islam.  While this particular argument quickly 
garnered controversy, Huntington does not stand alone in arguing for the importance of religion 
in foreign policy.  Rubin (1994) similarly emphasizes the importance of religion as the basis of 
political power and unity in many states, and names several examples where a state’s religious 
character impacts its foreign policy, such as Russian nationalists drawing on Orthodox 
Christianity to justify more assertive foreign policy, or the leaders of Iran’s Islamic Republic 
using their fundamentalist Islamic beliefs to justify their antagonism towards much of the West.  
Religion and religious officials increasingly play large roles in foreign policies across the globe 
(Luttwak, 1994; Rubin, 1994; Huntington, 1996; Abrams, 2001; Chaplin & Joustra, 2010).    
 The United States’ foreign policy does not escape the influence of religion, either.  
Commentators often discuss religion’s role here, ranging from how it frames the American 
foreign policy perspective to how it helps determine what objectives America actually prioritizes 
(Judis, 2005; Preston, 2012).  However, the influence of particular religious traditions on 
American foreign policy, in the case of this project conservative Christianity, deserves further 
attention.  As mentioned previously, the application of a religiously-informed narrative to foreign 
policy decision-making can be especially powerful.  One such religiously-infused narrative that 
Americans have drawn on for centuries (in various ways) to justify foreign policy decisions 
comes from the beliefs of some of America’s earliest colonists.  When the Puritans arrived in 
America, they brought their Protestant millennialist beliefs that promoted the view that their 
America would be favored by God and would be the spot to advance their religious mission 
(Twing, 1998; Judis, 2005).  The “City on the Hill” narrative contains a distinct foreign policy 
aspect to it that continues to reverberate in America today.  The Puritans opposed England’s 
religious persecution and European Catholicism in general, and framed these conflicts in the 
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language of heaven versus hell (Judis, 2005; Preston, 2012).  International relations thus took on 
spiritual significance as they constructed this simple dichotomy.  But not only was their mission 
to withstand opposing forces, America was to work to “recreate the world in its (and therefore 
God’s) image” (Twing, 1998, 15).  America was to be both a model and an agent of change. 
Even as Puritan dominance faded, American decision-makers have drawn on this 
narrative and other appeals to America’s religious character to justify their foreign policy 
stances.  The Second Great Awakening’s emphasis on a more emotional faith fused with 
nationalism and expansionism that in the wake of the War of 1812 to push the idea of Manifest 
Destiny (Ribuffo, 2001; Preston, 2010).  This general sense of religiously backed expansion 
remained as an impetus for late nineteenth century and early twentieth century American 
imperialism.  President McKinley noted that the colonization of the Philippines would be done in 
part to spread Christianity, and American missionaries brought with them the larger imprint of 
the American state as they traveled the globe (Ribuffo, 2001; Judis, 2005; Preston, 2010).  
American Cold War foreign policy also saw the impact of religion, whether it was strident anti-
atheistic Communism or relying on Catholicism as a criterion in choosing which South 
Vietnamese politician earned America’s backing (Wilcox, 1992; Burnett, 1994; Ribuffo, 2001; 
Preston, 2010).  Even in the twenty-first century, the City on the Hill myth showed up in 
President George W. Bush’s rhetoric in the wake of the 9/11 terror attacks and in the lead-up to 
the invasion of Iraq (Judis, 2005; Preston, 2012).  He repeatedly invoked God’s guidance for 
himself and the nation, and left little nuance in framing American policy towards the Middle East 
as a battle between good versus evil (Bacevich & Prodromou, 2004).  Appeals to religion in 
American foreign policy are not consistent and are often even conflicting from one era to the 
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next.  However, there should be no doubt that American religious beliefs and narratives have 
impacted and even fused with American foreign policy.   
 The Middle East is of course a major focus of American foreign policy.  The 
development of radical Islam and terrorism, the nuclear ambitions of several states in the region, 
and the supply of oil critical to the world economy mean that the Middle East demands attention.  
However, America’s interest in the region goes beyond its national security and economic 
importance.  Americans have long been fascinated with the Middle East in its role as the Holy 
Land.  As the origin point of the Abrahamic faiths, significant numbers of American Christians 
have seen the Middle East as a location to learn about their faith and to learn more about how to 
view contemporary events in the context of their faiths’ teachings (McAlister, 2005).  Beginning 
in the nineteenth century, American travelers, mostly Protestants, have been visiting the Holy 
Land in significant numbers.  Religious accounts, travel guides, paintings, and photographs all 
came back to and circulated within the United States as Americans looked to “immerse 
themselves in Holy Land imagery” (McAlister, 2005, 18).  Even American presidents were 
excited by the Holy Land, with President Franklin Roosevelt enthusiastically commenting on 
what he saw as he flew over Palestine in route to Iran (Grose, 1983).  This religious interest in 
the Middle East is one more factor adding to American foreign policy interest in the region.   
    Specifically, in regards to Israel, several scholars have touched on how American 
religion has shaped foreign policy towards that state.  America’s interest in Zionism goes back 
again to the Puritans, who saw America as a new Israel (Skillen, 2010).  This initial interest in 
creating an Israel helped lay the groundwork for the Zionism of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries in which Israel would be in Palestine, not America (Skillen, 2010).  American Jews, of 
course, have been the leading proponents of Zionism and numerous scholars (Grose, 1983; 
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Skillen, 2010) have noted the connections that Jewish Zionists such as Chaim Weizmann, 
Stephen Wise, and Abba Hillel Silver forged with American leaders.  But no American 
presidents have been Jewish, and most foreign policy decision makers over the course of 
American history have been Christian.  As previously mentioned in the introduction, the 
Christian faith of American decision-makers, along with Christian Zionist activists, have 
significantly shaped American foreign policy towards Israel (McAlister, 2005; Skillen, 2010; 
Rubin, 2012; Amstutz, 2014).  Merkley (2004) traces how the faith of every president beginning 
with Truman has impacted in some sense their policy treatment of Israel.  For example, in 
looking at the very recognition of Israel one can find the influence of Truman’s Baptist faith and 
consequent interest in biblical history.  Despite the warnings of some of his top foreign policy 
advisors, Truman led the United States to be the first country to recognize Israel, and explicitly 
referenced the religious aspect of his motivation by referring to himself as Cyrus, the Babylonian 
king who liberated Jews in the Bible (Grose, 1983; Merkley, 2004).   
By investigating how Christian Right leaders and interest groups have shaped American 
political discussion of and policy treatment towards Israel in presidential campaigns, policy 
platforms, and congressional votes, I will contribute to both literatures on how interest groups 
affect foreign policy and how religion in America has helped set American foreign policy.    
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III. Hypotheses and Data Description 
I hypothesize that in Republican primary presidential campaigns, candidates who are 
evangelical or who enjoy close ties to conservative Christian interest groups will be the most 
supportive of strengthening the American-Israeli relationship.  These candidates will devote 
more time to Israel and include more effusive rhetoric about the American-Israeli relationship in 
their debate performances, and these candidates will be unquestioning in their support of Israel 
throughout their campaign.  I will rely primary on debate transcripts, and journalistic and 
scholarly coverage of Israel in Republican presidential campaigns to test this hypothesis.   
I also hypothesize that the Christian Right, beginning with the 1980 GOP platform, will 
attempt to influence the language of the document.  In addition to their traditional social 
conservative interests, the Christian Right will also affect how the document treats Israel in 
regards to the language used, the amount of words devoted to Israel, and the placement of the 
Israel-related language in the document.  Specifically, I hypothesize that: (1) the amount of space 
as measured by word count devoted to Israel-related language will remain at least constant and 
probably grow; (2) their efforts will ensure that the documents frame the American-Israeli 
relationship as one with moral significance in addition to national security significance; and (3) 
Israel-related language will occupy increasingly prominent positions in the document by 
receiving its own dedicated section and appearing earlier overall within the document or at least 
the larger foreign policy section of the platform.  In testing this hypothesis, I will refer to the 
texts of past Republican platforms and examine how they have changed over the past several 
decades.  Additionally, I will refer to journalistic and scholarly coverage of the platform-writing 
processes and look specifically at the overall influence of the Christian Right on Israel-related 
policy in the writing of the platform.   
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Lastly, I hypothesize that evangelical members of Congress will be more likely to take 
pro-Israeli stances on legislation than non-evangelical members.  As discussed in the 
introduction of my paper, evangelical Christians often prioritize Israel in their foreign policy 
visions and I want to see if a statistically significant relationship exists between identifying as 
evangelical and voting for pro-Israel policies.  I plan to construct datasets made up of members 
during congresses that featured votes on relevant legislation.  Independent variables that I will 
include for each member include party affiliation and other measures of ideology, such as the 
National Journal vote ratings that measure economic, social, and foreign policy standpoints that 
also may explain why a member votes the way he or she does.  The independent variable of 
interest will be a dummy variable that will code if the member belongs to a Protestant 
denomination that is considered to be evangelical (Steensland et al., (2000) provide a useful and 
oft-cited classification of Protestant denominations into categories including evangelical and 
mainline).  The dependent variable will be whether or not the member took the pro-Israeli 
position on the vote.  Most votes in Congress that are explicitly about Israel receive high levels 
of support so I have instead identified two votes so far that were more divisive and can serve as 
proxies.  The first vote comes in 1981 when Congress voted on approving the sale of military 
hardware to Saudi Arabia.  Pro-Israeli forces, including Christian Right icon Jerry Falwell, 
mobilized in opposition to the sale, and several members of Congress discussed concern for 
Israeli security to justify their position on the vote.  The second vote is the recent legislation on 
support for President Obama’s nuclear deal with Iran.  Again, concern for how this deal would 
impact Israeli security was common in arguments over the deal, and Israeli Prime Minister 
Netanyahu himself lobbied Congress to oppose it.  Using logit and probit regression models, I 
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will test to see if there is a statistically significant relationship between evangelical faith and 
congressional support for Israel.              
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IV. Israel, the Christian Right and Republican Party Presidential Primaries 
Presidential candidates are usually a party’s most prominent politicians.  Their campaigns 
generate nationwide press coverage and introduce the candidates to voters across the country 
through advertisements, debates, and campaign events.  Candidates have a unique opportunity to 
champion their favored policies, bring these approaches to the forefront of American political 
discourse, and preview what may very well become law.  In the 2000 primary season, George W. 
Bush proposed major tax cuts; in 2008, Barack Obama emphasized his interest in reforming 
health care; and in 2016, Donald Trump called for building a wall on America’s southern border 
and for restricting Muslims from entering the United States.  These campaign seasons provide 
excellent opportunities to see how different issues gain or lose prominence in national politics, 
and if different factions in a party are prioritizing different policies.  I hypothesize that Israel will 
become a more prominent issue in GOP primaries since the rise of the Christian Right (by 
appearing more frequently as a topic in primary debates, for example), and that presidential 
candidates who are evangelical or who are trying to court the Christian Right (or both) are going 
to offer the most supportive, unquestioning stances on Israel compared to candidates who do not 
meet these criteria.  Evangelical candidates have a theological impetus to champion Israel, and 
candidates wanting to gain the support of conservative Christians may use Israel as a topic to 
appeal to evangelical voters’ religious sensibilities.  I will test these hypotheses by examining 
debate language and media coverage of candidates’ views on the Christian Right and Israel.   
The first primary material I am examining is the language used in primary debates (see 
appendix 1 for finding transcripts and video for considered debates).  I have chosen to only 
examine GOP primary debates because these debates give me more opportunities than a general 
election debate between one Republican and one Democrat to see if Republicans from different 
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religious backgrounds or who have different approaches to the Christian Right also have 
different approaches to Israel.  Just from the most recent primary season, readers may remember 
Texas Senator Ted Cruz’s repeated calls for moving the American embassy from Tel Aviv to 
Jerusalem, or Carly Fiorina saying that one of her first calls as president would be to Israeli 
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.  Debates are a useful measure of what issues candidates 
prioritize because candidates must pick and choose what they are going to discuss.  In a regular 
campaign speech, there is no moderator bearing down and telling the candidate to move on after 
two minutes; there is no real opportunity cost to mentioning Israel.  But in a debate, a candidate 
must be selective in deciding what to talk about in their opening and closing statements.  And in 
questions about the Middle East, are they going to spend their time talking only about getting 
troops out of Iraq or helping resolve the Syrian civil war, or will they also mention their views on 
Israel?  As I examine this language, I will again be engaging in content analysis: who is talking 
about Israel, what are they saying about Israel, and in what context are they saying it.  Context is 
important because talking about Israel in response to a question asked about Israel is not 
indicative of prioritizing Israel.  If a candidate talks about Israel in their closing statement or 
brings up Israel in response to a broader question about foreign policy, then that is interesting. 
 Using a master list of GOP primary debates compiled by the University of Virginia’s 
Center for Politics (Kondik & Skelley, 2015), I then used C-Span and the University of 
California-Santa Barbara’s American Presidency Project to locate as many videos and transcripts 
of these debates as I could.  From 2000 on, I have complete transcripts for all but two debates.  
The 1980, 1988, and 1996 records are less complete so I will be more cautious in my treatment 
of them as being representative of their primary seasons.  Because I do not have access to all the 
debates, it is possible that the ones I do have access to could be outliers in terms of Israel’s 
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frequency as a topic.  While I will leave them out of my quantitative analysis, I will return to 
them later as part of my overall evaluation.        
 Using these transcripts, I first went through every debate to find who was talking about 
Israel and under what circumstances.  At the most basic level, Israel has become an increasingly 
common subject of debate since 2000 (2004 is not included because incumbent GOP President 
George W. Bush ran for re-election and had no primary challenger).  In figure IV-1, one can see 
that the average number of times Israel is mentioned in a debate peaks at roughly eight in the 
2012 debates before falling a little in 2016.  Both are much higher than the averages in 2000 and 
2008.   
Figure IV-1 
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I am most interested in finding instances where a candidate starts discussing Israel when 
it is not “necessary” for them to bring the issue up.  I decided that if the moderator asks 
“Candidate A” a question about Israel or Palestine, or if another candidate references or 
comments on Candidate A’s position on Israel, these two circumstances effectively demand that 
Candidate A discuss Israel.  For the purposes of my investigation, all other instances of 
candidates discussing Israel are unsolicited and therefore more interesting.  For the next part of 
this analysis, I do not include all the mentions of Israel catalogued in figure IV-1, based on the 
following criteria.  I analyzed what was said about Israel and divided responses into two 
categories, substantive or un-substantive, based on whether or not the comment has any policy 
implications.  An example of an unsolicited mention of Israel that is not substantive, meaning 
that it indicates nothing about that candidate’s thoughts on Israel or American policy towards 
Israel, came in a 2008 debate from former Virginia Governor Jim Gilmore.  The moderator asked 
Gilmore about his opinions on George W. Bush’s cabinet shake-up.  Gilmore included in his 
response the following:  
We're going to have to engage in the Middle East, and we're going to have to do it for an 
extended and a long period of time.  It isn't just an Iraq issue. This is an issue of the 
challenges that we're facing between the Palestinians and the Israelis, the challenge 
between Sunnis and Shiites -- the problem with people on the street not even agreeing 
with their own regimes – Jim Gilmore, 5/3/07  
 
 Gilmore mentioned Israel without having to, but he said nothing remarkable about Israel 
and lumped it in with problems arising out of Sunni-Shiite tensions.  In contrast, there are many 
ways of bringing up American policy towards Israel that I considered to be substantive in some 
form.  These range from simple statements about America’s continued support for Israel to calls 
to move the American embassy to Jerusalem to opposing the Iran deal because of its implications 
for Israel to criticism of political opponents’ policies towards Israel.  These examples provide a 
38 
 
hint of the candidate’s views on Israel, and the vast majority of unsolicited mentions of Israel fall 
under this category.   
 Once I had determined for each primary season what the substantive comments were and 
who had said them, I then examined which candidates tend to provide these comments more than 
others.  To do so, I counted the number of unsolicited comments per candidate and then divided 
that number by the number of debates the candidate participated in to account for differing 
campaign longevities. For example, in 2016 Florida Senator Marco Rubio discussed Israel on his 
own initiative seven times over twelve debates, meaning that he provided .53 unsolicited 
discussions of Israel per debate.  This number on its own does not make much sense, as a 
candidate cannot provide half of a discussion in a debate, but it is useful when comparing it to 
other candidates’ ratios.   
 With ratios for forty-three candidacies, I ordered them from largest to smallest.  
Seventeen candidates, roughly forty percent of this population, are evangelical.  Fourteen of the 
forty-three candidates never discussed Israel on their own initiative (figure IV-2).  For the other 
twenty-nine candidates, I divided them into three groups: a top ten (column 1), a middle ten 
(column 2), and a bottom nine (column 3).  I have bolded all evangelical candidates in Figure 
IV-2. 
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Figure IV-2 
 
  
 
 
 
The data do not support my hypothesis that evangelical candidates in general are more 
likely to talk about Israel.  If one looks at lists of candidates who never brought up Israel of their 
own accord one finds six evangelicals and eight non-evangelicals on the list.  Based on these 
numbers, thirty-five percent of evangelical candidates since 2000 never brought up Israel on their 
own in a debate.  Twenty-seven percent of non-evangelical candidates fell in this category.  
Contrary to my hypothesis, a greater proportion of non-evangelical candidates than evangelical 
candidates brought up Israel.  Even among those who discussed Israel the most, for example, the 
top six, three were evangelical and three were not.     
Evangelicals are also not more particularly intense in their rhetorical support for Israel 
than non-evangelical candidates, as illustrated by the 2016 debates.  Both types of candidates 
Bottom 9
Brownback (2008) 0.14
Giuliani (2008) 0.14
Huckabee (2008) 0.13
Christie (2016) 0.13
Hatch (2000) 0.125
Forbes (2000) 0.11
Romney (2012) 0.1
Huntsman (2012) 0.09
Ron Paul (2012) 0.05
Top 10
Huckabee (2016) 0.86
Cruz (2016) 0.83
Pataki (2016) 0.75
Rubio (2016) 0.58
Gilmore (2008) 0.5
Graham (2016) 0.5
Santorum (2012) 0.37
Pawlenty (2012) 0.33
Bachmann (2012) 0.31
Carson (2016) 0.3
Middle 10
Fiorina (2016) 0.29
Trump (2016) 0.27
Jindal (2016) 0.25
George Bush (2000) 0.22
Jeb Bush (2016) 0.22
McCain (2008) 0.2
Cain (2012) 0.18
Kasich (2016) 0.17
Gingrich (2012) 0.15
Perry (2012) 0.15
Tancredo (2008) 0
Thompson (2008) 0
Gilmore (2016) 0
Rand Paul (2016) 0
Perry (2016) 0
Santorum (2016) 0
Walker (2016) 0
The Silent
McCain (2000) 0
Bauer (2000) 0
Keyes (2000) 0
Hunter (2008) 0
Keyes (2008) 0
Ron Paul (2008) 0
Romney (2008) 0
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boasted about their support for Israel, and denounced the Obama administration’s approach.  
Examples from the evangelical group include Texas Senator Ted Cruz’s call for moving the 
American embassy in Tel Aviv to Jerusalem (8/6/15), and his referring to Israel as, “One of our 
strongest allies in the world” (3/10/16).  Dr. Ben Carson chastised the Obama administration for 
turning America’s back on Israel (8/6/15).  Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee mentioned in 
several debates his concern for the dangers Israel faces (8/6/15; 9/16/15).  Several non-
evangelicals made similar statements of support over the course of the debates.  For example, 
Ohio Governor John Kasich said that, “We have no better ally in the world” than Israel 
(11/10/15).  Florida Senator Marco Rubio criticized the Obama administration for betraying 
Israel (1/14/16), and said America must be loyal to them (2/13/16).  Florida Governor Jeb Bush 
echoed Cruz in calling for the embassy’s move to Jerusalem, and added that America must 
strengthen Israeli technological superiority over their enemies (1/14/16).  Donald Trump, 
attacked in one debate (3/10/16) for not being a strong enough supporter of Israel, responded by 
saying: “There’s nobody on this stage that’s more pro-Israel than I am . . . I have tremendous 
love for Israel.”  Not only do evangelicals fail to outdo non-evangelicals in bringing up Israel, no 
noticeable difference in intensity of support exists in examining their language.      
Whether or not a candidate was trying to attract the Christian Right seems to have no 
effect on how much he or she discusses Israel.  It is difficult to find a Republican candidate who 
has not attempted to appeal to the Christian Right, and courters are spread from the most 
talkative on Israel to least talkative.  For example, among the most likely to mention Israel, one 
can find plenty of candidates who courted the Christian Right such as Arkansas Governor Mike 
Huckabee, Pennsylvania Senator Rick Santorum, and Texas Senator Ted Cruz.  Among those 
who never brought up Israel, plenty of candidates courted the Christian Right like Gary Bauer, 
41 
 
Ambassador Alan Keyes, and Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker.  One might argue that some 
candidates simply do not feel comfortable discussing Israel because they have little experience in 
foreign affairs. However, numerous examples refute this particular explanation.  For example, 
several governors, a position that usually involves few foreign policy choices, appear in the top 
ten: Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee, New York Governor John Pataki, Virginia Governor 
Jim Gilmore, and Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty.  Neurosurgeon Ben Carson, someone with 
no public service experience, appears in the top ten.  If one extends this consideration to the top 
fifteen, then one also finds businesspeople Carly Fiorina and Donald Trump, Louisiana Governor 
Bobby Jindal, Texas Governor George W. Bush, and Florida Governor Jeb Bush, again a group 
without much foreign policy expertise.  Among the silent include many individuals who do have 
such expertise.  Alan Keyes, a former ambassador to the United Nations and assistant secretary 
of state (Merida, 2000), never mentioned Israel of his own accord in a debate in either of his 
2000 or 2008 campaigns.  California Congressman Duncan Hunter had chaired the House Armed 
Services Committee before his 2008 bid (“Committee Chairmen”), and in 2000, Senator John 
McCain was already considered a senior member of the Senate Armed Services Committee 
(Dewar, 2000).  Despite their experience, they never brought up Israel on their own initiative.  
Lack of foreign policy expertise does not stop a candidate from discussing Israel, and 
comfortability with foreign policy does not ensure a candidate will bring up Israel.   
 The three primary seasons that I do not have complete transcripts for, and thus have left 
out of this analysis, still help to support the conclusion that evangelical status or interest in 
courting the Christian Right have little influence on talking about Israel in debates.  Israel was 
never a topic of discussion by any candidate in the accessible debates from 1980.  In the 1988 
debates, only two instances occurred where a candidate discussed Israel substantively on his own 
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initiative, and that was New York Congressman Jack Kemp, an evangelical who courted the 
Christian Right (Reid, 1987c; Katz, 1988).  In 1996, only three instances occurred, and the 
candidates responsible were Indiana Senator Dick Lugar, California Congressman Bob Dornan, 
and publisher Steve Forbes.  None of these men was evangelical.  Lugar and Dornan both 
courted the Christian Right (Berke, 1995b; “Conservative Christians,” 1996; Edsall, 1995; Keen, 
1995).  Forbes did not, and actually found himself the victim of Christian Right attacks 
(Beltrame, 1996; Berke, 1996).  What is most telling about these early primary campaigns is not 
so much who was talking or what he was saying, but that Israel is largely missing from the 
discussion.  While I cannot be sure that these are a representative sample, the available evidence 
suggests that Israel has become a much more common debate topic in the twenty-first century 
than the twentieth.     
 For the remainder of this chapter, I tried to take a bit broader overview of GOP 
presidential candidates and Israel by investigating media coverage of the primaries in order to 
identify candidates who were pro-Israel.  Overall, Israel’s role in Republican primaries has 
become more prominent in media coverage.  Beginning with the 1980 primary, I recorded the 
number of articles appearing in The Washington Post and The New York Times, two national 
newspapers of record, that contained the words “Israel,” “Republican,” “primary,” and 
“President” (the articles were aggregated by the LexisNexis Academic database) from January 1st 
of the year prior to the general election until the day before the GOP convention, when the 
primary season ended.  Figure IV-3 illustrates that while the number of articles including these 
words has not increased consistently in every primary season, there is an upwards trend (2004 is 
again not included because incumbent GOP President George W. Bush ran for re-election).    
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Figure IV-3 
      
 
 
 
 
 
To further examine which candidates were generating news on Israel and what they were 
saying about Israel, I used other media sources in addition to the two above to have a more 
complete picture of the primary field.  If one returns to the previous discussion of Israel in 
debates or the discussion of GOP platforms, at first glance, Republicans and the GOP seem to 
consistently offer Israel uncompromising support.  In examining newspaper coverage aggregated 
by Lexis-Nexis (ranging from national papers like The Washington Post to more regional papers 
such as The St. Louis Post-Dispatch), I am not trying to compile and compare numbers of articles 
related to a particular candidate and Israel.  Instead, I am searching for any instance where a 
candidate departs from the norm of support for Israel, and that is why I am surveying such a 
broad range of media.  Views that I consider to be unorthodox include calls to cut aid to Israel, 
chastisement of Israel, or saying nothing about Israel.  While not saying anything about Israel 
does not mean the candidate does not support Israel, this silence should still be treated as a 
deviation because some candidates in every primary season did find time to make their views on 
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Israel known.  Saying nothing reflects a relatively low prioritization of Israel compared to the 
candidate’s competitors.  In the tables below, I have organized candidates according to their 
evangelical status and their interest in courting the Christian Right.  This organization allows me 
to compare whether non-evangelicals or candidates who do not court the Christian Right deviate 
from the norm of unquestioning support for Israel at a higher rate than evangelical or Christian 
Right-aligned candidates.  The candidates have been placed in one of four categories: (1) 
evangelical candidates who courted the Christian Right; (2) evangelical candidates who did not 
court the Christian Right; (3) non-evangelical candidates who courted the Christian Right; and 
(4) non-evangelical candidates who did not court the Christian Right.  If my hypotheses are 
supported, the evangelical candidates and the candidates courting the Christian Right are more 
likely to offer unquestioning support for Israel than other candidates as reported by the media.   
Not every single GOP candidate for president since 1980 is included in my sample for a 
couple reasons.  In the previous section, the candidates I examined were effectively selected for 
me.  They were the candidates who participated in debates.  Here I want to be cautious in my 
selection.  For example, let’s say there is a hypothetical candidate who is not evangelical, did not 
court the Christian Right, and had nothing reported to say on Israel.  Let’s also add that this 
candidate was only in the race for three months and never polled over one percent.  If this 
candidate never had the time to talk about Israel, or the media simply never paid attention to 
what they had to say, then it is not fair to factor this candidate in as an example of non-
evangelical, non-Christian Right candidates being less supportive of Israel. To control for this 
potential problem, candidates must meet two criteria to be included in this part of the analysis.  
The candidate must have actively contested one primary contest (a test of viability) and must 
have participated in at least one nationally televised debate (a test of recognition).  I was very 
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lenient in determining if a candidate courted the Christian Right.  I had hypothesized that 
candidates who were trying to appeal to conservative Christians would be more likely to 
prioritize Israel.  I did not factor into my hypothesis how successful the candidates were at 
appealing to this demographic’s sensibilities.  Thus, I consider pretty much any outreach at all to 
the Christian Right community as evidence of courting, even if the candidate ended up failing to 
garner evangelical support.  Again I only drew on articles aggregated through Lexis-Nexis to 
determine if a candidate courted the Christian Right.  One cannot with any solid confidence 
distinguish between attending a Values Voters Summit, speaking at Liberty University, or 
meeting with religious broadcasters as differing in levels of outreach.  These and a host of other 
similar types of outreach are all acceptable for my purposes, as long as they generate media 
coverage.   
As one looks at the tables, one notices I have italicized numerous candidates.  
Italicization indicates that the candidate deviates from the norm with their position on Israel by 
advocating for less American support of Israel, criticizing Israel, or not saying anything at all 
about Israel.  Candidates who are recorded as saying positive things about Israel, and no 
unorthodox views are simply marked as supporting Israel.  Similar to my thoughts on Christian 
Right outreach, one cannot distinguish with confidence between calling for more aid to Israel, 
moving the American embassy to Jerusalem, providing Israel with more military hardware, or 
just generally insisting that America will support them as differing in levels of commitment to 
Israel.       
 I will first discuss the evangelical candidates (tables 1 and 2), all of whom, except for 
Illinois Congressman John Anderson in 1980, courted the Christian Right.  There are seventeen 
of them, and only three candidacies deviate from the norm of support for Israel (eighteen percent 
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of this demographic): Illinois Congressman Phil Crane’s 1980 campaign, and the 2008 and 2012 
campaigns of Texas Congressman Ron Paul.  I treat Paul’s two campaigns as different 
candidacies (and do the same for other candidates who make multiple runs), because some 
candidates who run multiple times change their position on courting the Christian Right or their 
messaging on Israel over time, and I want to capture these differences.  Thus, only eighteen 
percent of evangelical candidacies deviate from standard support for Israel.  Ron Paul is one of 
the most idiosyncratic candidates of the past few decades, and his deviation can be easily 
explained by his staunch commitment to his libertarian ideology.  This ideology calls for cutting 
all foreign aid and being less involved in world affairs; Paul argued in one debate that American 
intervention is not always helpful and is far too costly for the nation: 
We support Israel, and we try to have this balance. But I think it would be much better to 
have a balance by being out of there. And I think it would be a greater incentive for Israel 
and the Palestinians and all the Arab nations to come together and talk because I think we 
get in the way too often of these. And besides, it's costing us a lot of money and it's 
costing us lives now.  And it's time that we come to the point where we believe the world 
can solve some of their problems without us – Ron Paul, 1/10/08 
 
In that same debate, Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee (1/10/08) responded to this 
point by casting Paul’s isolationism as dangerous for the Middle East, and especially for Israel: 
“And for us to give the world the impression that we would stand by if it were under attack and 
simply say, ’It's not our problem,’ would be recklessly irresponsible on our part.”  New York 
City Mayor Rudy Giuliani also criticized Paul in the same debate after Paul said America treats 
Israel as a step-child, saying: 
I think the idea that Israel is a stepchild of the United States is totally absurd . . . The 
reality is that Israel is a close and strong ally of the United States . . . The defense of 
Israel is of critical importance to the United States of America, and it goes much deeper 
than just tactical things – Rudy Giuliani, 1/10/08 
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Paul was not able to escape attempts to characterize him as anti-Israel in his 2012 
campaign, either.  For example, the Republican Jewish Coalition excluded him from their forum 
for presidential candidates, saying that Paul’s congressional record and stances in the campaign 
were anti-Israel (McGreal, 2011a).  Besides the idiosyncratic Paul, Phil Crane, who simply has 
no recorded views on Israel, is the only other evangelical not to offer full support for Israel.    
Table 1 
Evangelical candidates who courted the Christian Right 
Candidate Religion Christian Right 
connection 
Views on Israel 
1980 Primary    
Ronald Reagan Disciples of Christ 
yet considers himself 
born again (Hyer, 
1980) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Clendinen, 
1980; Rosenfeld, 
1980b) 
Supporter of Israel 
(Reagan, 1979; 
Cannon, 1980) 
Philip Crane “Outspoken 
Christian” (Reid, 
1980) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Reid, 1980; 
Rosenfeld, 1980a) 
No record of views 
1988 Primary    
Pat Robertson Southern Baptist 
(Binyon, 1987; Reid, 
1987a)  
Courted Christian 
Right (Binyon, 1987; 
Reid, 1987b) 
Supporter of Israel 
(McCartney, 1988; 
Reid, 1988a) 
Jack Kemp Born again 
Presbyterian (Dowd, 
1987; Katz, 1988) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Reid, 1987c; 
Katz, 1988) 
 
Supporter of Israel 
(Pear & Berke, 1987; 
Weinraub, 1987a) 
2000 Primary    
George W. Bush Evangelical 
Methodist (Niebuhr, 
2000) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Sherman, 
1999; Niebuhr, 2000) 
 
Supporter of Israel 
(Mitchell, 2000; 
Pipes, 2000) 
Gary Bauer Baptist (Bruni, 1999) Courted Christian 
Right (Baxter, 1999; 
Henneberger, 2000) 
Supporter of Israel 
(Baxter, 1999; Walsh, 
1999) 
2008 Primary    
Mike Huckabee Southern Baptist 
(Kirkpatrick & 
Powell, 2008) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Kirkpatrick & 
Powell, 2008) 
Supporter of Israel 
(Gerstein, 2008; 
Krieger, 2008) 
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Duncan Hunter Baptist (“The 
Republican 
Candidates,” 2007) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Dine, 2007; 
Goodstein, 2007)  
Supporter of Israel 
(Spring, 2007) 
Ron Paul Baptist (Caldwell, 
2007) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Goodman, 
2007) 
Has taken anti-Israel 
votes, largely in 
opposition to foreign 
aid (Caldwell, 2007; 
Kornacki, 2008) 
Fred Thompson Church of Christ 
(Harnden, 2007) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Harper, 2007; 
Luo, 2007b) 
Supporter of Israel 
(Copeland, 2007; 
Solomon, 2007) 
2012 Primary    
Michele Bachmann Evangelical (Harris, 
2011a; MacAskill, 
2011) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Eckholm, 
2011; MacAskill, 
2011) 
Supporter of Israel 
(Liebler, 2011; 
McGreal, 2011b) 
Rick Perry Methodist, attends 
evangelical 
megachurch 
(Fernandez, 2011; 
Parker, 2011) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Fernandez, 
2011; Parker, 2011) 
Supporter of Israel 
(McGreal, 2011b; 
Oppel, 2011a) 
Ron Paul Baptist (Caldwell, 
2007) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Fabian, 2011) 
Supports ending aid 
to Israel, ends up 
barred from the 
Republican Jewish 
Coalition for his 
views on Israel and 
Iran (McGreal, 
2011a; Rutenberg & 
Kovalevski, 2011) 
2016 Primary    
Ted Cruz Southern Baptist 
(Bailey, 2015) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Gabriel & 
Martin, 2015; 
Gabriel, 2016) 
Strong support for 
Israel (Phillip & 
Johnson, 2016; 
Zezima, 2016) 
Mike Huckabee Southern Baptist 
(Blakely, 2015) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Gabriel & 
Martin, 2015; 
Gabriel, 2016) 
Strong support for 
Israel (Mullany, 
2015b; Rudoren, 
2015b) 
Ben Carson Seventh Day 
Adventist 
(Rappeport, 2015b) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Zezima, 2015; 
McCarthy, 2016) 
Strong support for 
Israel (Linde, 2015; 
Mullany, 2015a) 
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Table 2 
Evangelical candidates who did not court the Christian Right 
Candidate Religion Christian Right 
connection 
Views on Israel 
1980 Primary    
John Anderson Born-again 
evangelical (Balz, 
1980) 
No record of 
courting, used faith to 
justify some liberal 
positions (Balz, 1980; 
MacPherson, 1980a) 
Support for Israel, 
criticized Connally’s 
plan for the Middle 
East (“Connally 
Mideast,” 1979; 
Omang, 1979) 
 
 There is far more deviation present among the non-evangelical candidates (tables 3 and 
4).  Out of thirty-six candidates, ten candidates (twenty-eight percent of the group) deviate from 
unquestioning support of Israel.  A few examples spanning my period of inquiry are helpful in 
illustrating the range of comments that qualify as deviating from unquestioning support. 
 Some of the most controversial breaks with Israel include Texas Governor John 
Connally’s proposal in the 1980 campaign to broker peace in the Middle East.  The plan included 
having Israel’s right to exist recognized by Arab countries, the creation of a Palestinian state, and 
a guarantee of stable oil supply for the West.  This plan quickly drew criticism from leaders of 
the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, the American Jewish 
Committee, and the Union of American Hebrew Congregations.  Competitors for the nomination 
such as Anderson and Tennessee Senator Howard Baker criticized Connally’s plan for its 
treatment of Israel, and Jewish members of Connally’s campaign even quit their jobs in protest 
(“Connally Mideast,” 1979; Goshko, 1979; Lescaze, 1979).  
50 
 
 In 1996, Pat Buchanan’s comments likely qualify as the most anti-Israel of any candidate, 
as he referred to Israel as “a strategic albatross draped around the neck of the United States” (as 
quoted in Goar, 1996).  Additionally, Buchanan derided Capitol Hill as “Israeli-occupied 
territory,” and denounced what he called Israel’s American “amen corner” (both quoted in Sharn, 
1996) in his calls to end foreign aid to Israel.  In an article exploring Buchanan’s struggle to win 
over Christian conservatives, the Christian Coalition’s Ralph Reed and the Traditional Values 
Coalition’s Lou Sheldon both noted that Buchanan’s views on Israel were at odds with many 
evangelicals, and Sheldon cited Buchanan’s stance on Israel as the principal reason for him not 
supporting Buchanan (Sharn, 1996).   
 Some candidates have offered much more measured critiques of Israel, but such critiques 
still place them outside the GOP norm.  For example, in 1988, Kansas Senator Bob Dole 
criticized Israel’s treatment of Palestinian protestors, and did not criticize the Reagan 
administration allowing the United Nations to censure Israel even though every other primary 
candidate besides Vice-President Bush did (Rosenbaum, 1987; Weinraub, 1988).  And in 2016, 
even as he repeatedly affirmed his support for Israel, candidate Donald Trump displeased many 
when he said he would act as a neutral party in negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, 
and when he failed to commit to an undivided Jerusalem as Israel’s capital at the Republican 
Jewish Coalition forum (Mahler, 2016; Rucker & Costa, 2016).  
Overall, my hypothesis regarding evangelical support for Israel does find support here.  
Non-evangelical candidates have been more likely to say nothing, advocate less American 
support for Israel, or criticize Israel in some fashion than evangelical candidates.  But the data do 
not support my hypothesis that candidates courting the Christian Right are likely to be more 
supportive of Israel than non-courting candidates.  Only one (the previously discussed John 
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Connally) of the eight candidates who did not court the Christian Right broke with full support 
for Israel.  Twelve of the forty-five candidates who courted the Christian Right (27%) deviated 
from full, unquestioning support of Israel in some way.  Plenty of them had nothing to say on 
Israel, advocated less support for Israel, or even criticized Israel: Bob Dole in 1988, Alan Keyes 
in 1996, Pat Buchanan in 1996, and Rand Paul in 2016 are just a few examples.  Israel does 
appear to be a contributing factor for conservative Christians as they evaluate candidates.  As 
mentioned earlier, Buchanan struggled to gain traction with some evangelicals because of his 
stance on Israel (Sharn, 1996); in 2012, Iowa Family Leader president Bob Vander Plaats noted 
that Ron Paul’s stance on Israel was discouraging to him and other Iowa evangelicals in the lead 
up to the 2012 caucuses (Horowitz, 2011); and at a 2015 Faith and Freedom Coalition summit, 
Vander Plaats and other evangelical activists noted that candidates’ foreign policy stances, 
especially regarding Israel, had piqued many attendees’ attentions (Wollner, 2015).  Despite 
evangelicals clearly valuing a candidate’s stance on Israel, this has not translated to unanimous, 
uncompromising support for Israel among candidates looking to make inroads with the 
evangelical community.   
Even among candidates who always support Israel, they do not always highlight their 
support for Israel as a way to attract the Christian Right.  In 2008, for example, candidates could 
and did discuss a variety of issues at the Values Voter Summit.  Massachusetts Governor Mitt 
Romney emphasized his pro-life position, Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee called for 
attendees to evaluate a candidate’s social conservative convictions, and Arizona Senator John 
McCain reflected on his imprisonment in Vietnam.  But New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani 
was the only one reported to talk about his support for Israel (Balz, 2007; Luo, 2007b; Shear, 
2007; Sullivan, 2007).  At the Family Leadership Summit in 2015, nine contenders appeared 
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before a crowd of mostly religious conservatives.  Some did mention Israel in the course of the 
discussion, but others, like Pennsylvania Senator Rick Santorum and Dr. Ben Carson, failed to 
do so despite their strong recorded support for Israel (“2015 Family,” 2015).  One can also return 
to part one of this chapter and find that numerous Christian Right-courting candidates failed to 
bring up Israel on their own initiative during debates.  Israel can be part of an evangelical voter’s 
calculus in GOP primaries, but among the candidates themselves there are plenty of times where 
they ignore the issue in their outreach to this community.          
 It has become far less common for candidates to find fault with some part of American 
policy towards Israel.  For example, concerning non-evangelical candidates, seventy percent of 
the candidates who departed from the norm ran their campaigns in the 1980, 1988, or 1996 
campaign seasons.  The three latest were Ambassador Alan Keyes in 2008 (with no record of 
comments on Israel), Trump’s previously discussed comments on Israel in 2016, and Kentucky 
Senator Rand Paul’s willingness to consider cutting aid to Israel in 2016 (Haberman, 2015; 
“Rand Paul,” 2015).   
Courting the Christian Right is essentially a requirement of GOP primaries, even if one 
does not succeed.  The last campaign that meets my criteria and did not court the Christian Right 
was John McCain’s 2000 candidacy.  They remain an important constituency in GOP primaries, 
but apparently their importance does not translate into uniform support for Israel or uniform 
interest in discussing support for Israel.                     
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Tables 3 
Non-evangelical candidates who courted the Christian Right 
Candidate Religion Christian Right 
connection 
Views on Israel 
1980 Primary    
Bob Dole  Methodist (Weinraub, 
1987b) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Rosenfeld, 
1980a) 
Supporter of Israel, 
took anti-PLO 
stances (Dole, 1979; 
Oberdorfer, 1979) 
1988 Primary    
George H. W. Bush Episcopalian (Taylor 
& Hoffman, 1987) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Taylor & 
Hoffman, 1987; Katz, 
1988) 
Supporter of Israel 
but did blame Israel 
over arms sales to 
Iran; defended 
Reagan policies that 
were seen as 
chastising Israel 
(Rosenbaum, 1987; 
Pincus & Woodward, 
1988) 
Bob Dole Methodist (Weinraub, 
1987b) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Katz, 1988; 
Lewington, 1988) 
Supporter of Israel 
but did criticize 
Israeli response to 
Arab protesters; did 
not condemn Reagan 
policies chastising 
Israel unlike all other 
candidates except 
Bush (Rosenbaum, 
1987; Weinraub, 
1988) 
1996 Primary    
Bob Dole Methodist (Weinraub, 
1987b) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Beltrame, 
1995; Rhodes, 1995)  
Supporter of Israel 
(Lippman, 1995; 
Sciolino, 1996b) 
Pat Robertson Catholic (Bernstein, 
1996) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Debenport, 
1995; Edsall, 1996a; 
Edsall, 1996b) 
Wants to end aid to 
Israel and has 
criticized Israeli 
influence in American 
government (Goar, 
1996; Sharn, 1996) 
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Alan Keyes Catholic (Kolbert, 
1995) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Debenport, 
1995; Kolbert, 1995) 
No record on Israel 
Bob Dornan Catholic (Ayres, 
1995) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Keen, 1995; 
“Conservative 
Christians,” 1996) 
No record on Israel 
Lamar Alexander  Presbyterian 
(Tollerson, 1995) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Debenport, 
1995; Walker, 1996) 
Supporter of Israel 
(Fraser, 1995) 
Phil Gramm Episcopalian 
(Niebuhr, 1995 
Courted Christian 
Right (Berke, 1995a; 
Niebuhr, 1995) 
Supporter Israel 
(Haberman, 1995; 
Lardner, 1995) 
Dick Lugar Methodist (Edsall, 
1995a) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Berke, 1995b; 
Edsall, 1995a) 
No record of views 
2000 Primary    
Alan Keyes Catholic (Kolbert, 
1995) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Nickens, 
1999; Henneberger, 
2000) 
Supporter of Israel 
(Walsh, 1999) 
Orrin Hatch Mormon (McMullen, 
1999) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Hauserman, 
1999; McMullen, 
1999) 
Supporter of Israel 
(Walsh, 1999; 
Milbank, 2000) 
Steve Forbes Episcopalian 
(“Candidate-by-
candidate,” 1999) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Neal, 1999; 
Neal & Edsall, 1999) 
Supporter of Israel 
(Walsh, 1999) 
2008 Primary    
John McCain Episcopalian (Broder, 
1999) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Luo 2007b) 
Supporter of Israel 
(Ben-David, 2008) 
Mitt Romney Mormon (Bacon, 
2007) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Bacon, 2007; 
Luo, 2007a) 
Supporter of Israel 
(Krieger, 2007; 
Lipman, 2007) 
Alan Keyes Catholic (Kolbert, 
1995) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Gilgoff, 2008) 
No record on Israel 
Rudy Giuliani Catholic (Santora, 
2007) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Luo, 2007c; 
Santora, 2007) 
Supporter of Israel 
(Cooper & Santora, 
2007; Santora, 2007) 
2012 Primary    
Mitt Romney Mormon (Bacon, 
2007) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Tumulty, 
2011) 
 
Supporter of Israel 
(Oppel, 2011b; 
Barbaro, 2012b) 
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Rick Santorum Catholic (Lorber, 
2012) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Horowitz, 
2011; Barbaro, 
2012a) 
Supporter of Israel 
(Kessler, 2012; 
Knickerbocker, 2012) 
Newt Gingrich  Catholic (Lorber, 
2012) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Eckholm, 
2011; Lorber, 2012) 
Supporter of Israel 
(Knickerbocker, 
2012; McGreal, 
2012) 
Jon Huntsman Mormon (Tumulty, 
2011) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Fabian, 2011; 
Tumulty, 2011) 
Supporter of Israel 
(Henderson, 2011; 
Strauss, 2011) 
2016 Primary    
Donald Trump Presbyterian (Posner, 
2016) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Gabriel, 
2015b; Haberman, 
2016) 
Offered support for 
Israel, but did make 
some missteps 
(Mahler, 2016; 
Rucker & Costa, 
2016) 
Jeb Bush Catholic (Vozzella, 
2015) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Vozzella, 
2015; Roberts, 2016) 
Supporter of Israel 
(Costa & Gold, 2015; 
Mullany, 2015c) 
Marco Rubio Catholic (Sullivan, 
2016) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Gabriel & 
Martin, 2015; 
Sullivan, 2016) 
Supporter of Israel 
(Parker, 2015) 
Rand Paul Presbyterian 
(Hampson, 2015) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Gabriel, 
2015a; Gabriel & 
Martin, 2015) 
Supports Israel but 
wants to cut aid 
(Haberman, 2015; 
“Rand Paul,” 2015) 
Carly Fiorina Non-denominational 
Protestant 
(Grossman, 2015a) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Gabriel, 
2015a; Gabriel & 
Martin, 2015) 
Supporter of Israel 
(Desjardins & 
McHaney, 2015; 
Martin, 2015) 
Chris Christie Catholic (Taft, 2015) Courted Christian 
Right (Peters, 2015) 
Supporter of Israel 
(Corasaniti, 2015b; 
Hanna, 2015) 
John Kasich Episcopalian (Turner, 
2016) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Malloy, 2015) 
Supporter of Israel 
(Landler & 
Haberman, 2016; 
Phillip & Johnson, 
2016) 
Rick Santorum Catholic (Lorber, 
2012) 
Courted Christian 
Right (Gabriel, 
2015a; Gabriel & 
Martin, 2015) 
Supporter of Israel 
(Corasaniti, 2015a; 
D. Smith, 2015) 
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Table 4 
Non-evangelical candidates who did not court the Christian Right 
1980 Primary    
George H. W. Bush Episcopalian (Taylor 
& Hoffman, 1987) 
No record of outreach Supporter of Israel 
(Oberdorfer, 1979) 
Howard Baker Presbyterian 
(Schelzig, 2014) 
No record of outreach Supporter of Israel 
(“Connally Mideast,” 
1979) 
John Connally Methodist (Quinn, 
1979) 
No record of 
outreach 
Proposed 
controversial Middle 
East peace plan, 
accused of bartering 
Israeli security for oil 
(Goshko, 1979; 
Lescaze, 1979) 
1988 Primary    
Pete du Pont Episcopalian 
(Cornell, 1988) 
No record of outreach Supporter of Israel 
(Rosenbaum, 1987) 
Alexander Haig Catholic (King, 1987) No record of outreach Supporter of Israel 
(Rosenbaum, 1987; 
Lewis, 1988) 
1996 Primary    
Steve Forbes Episcopalian 
(Bumiller, 1996) 
Attacked by the 
Christian Right 
(Beltrame, 1996; 
Berke, 1996) 
Supporter of Israel 
(Sciolino, 1996a)  
 
2000 Primary    
John McCain Episcopalian (Broder, 
1999) 
Attacked Christian 
Right influence 
(Barstow, 2000; 
Sack, 2000)  
Supporter of Israel 
(Walsh, 1999; 
Zacharia, 2000) 
 
 In conclusion, the data present a mixed record, with some support for my hypotheses.  In 
debate performances, Israel has become a more common topic but evangelical or Christian 
Right-oriented candidates cannot take all the credit.  A higher proportion of non-evangelicals 
bring up Israel on their own initiative, and evangelicals do not even seem to be more intense in 
their support for Israel based off their language.  The broader survey of media coverage also 
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supports the claim that Israel has become a more common topic in GOP primaries among 
candidates.  For example, in the four primary seasons since 1996, only one candidate who met 
my criteria never discussed Israel enough for the media to report on his views; the 1996 primary 
season alone had three such candidates.  Additionally, the data indicate that evangelicals tend to 
be more unquestioning in their support of Israel than non-evangelicals, with a far smaller 
proportion of the former offering unorthodox views.  However, a greater proportion of 
candidates courting the Christian Right offer unorthodox views as opposed to non-courting 
candidates.  Israel has become increasingly addressed in GOP primary seasons since 1980, but 
evangelical candidates are not wholly responsible, and a candidate’s interest in pleasing the 
Christian Right does not entail unquestioning support for Israel.      
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V. Israel, the Christian Right, and Republican Party Platforms 
Since 1980, the Christian Right has been a powerful force in Republican politics, and has 
attempted to use its clout to influence the GOP’s platform (see appendix 2 for source for all 
referenced GOP platforms).  Its overt presence at past conventions has waxed and waned, yet 
many of its priorities have become key parts of the platform over the past several decades.  For 
example, thanks in part to their activism, restrictions on abortion and opposition to gay rights 
feature prominently in recent platforms.    
Platforms serve several functions in addition to their most basic one of allowing political 
parties to state their principles and goals.  They provide a signal to voters by publicizing the 
political and policy paths a party will take if in power.  Being able to compare different parties’ 
stances on certain issues allows voters to make a more informed choice on election day.  
Platforms are also a tool for accountability.  Voters and other watchdogs can compare a 
politician’s or party’s actions with the platform to determine if they are following through on 
their promises.  A party may also use platforms to reward or placate disgruntled factions within 
the party.  Adding, deleting, or changing language within the platform carries symbolic weight 
and can demonstrate a party’s commitment to certain priorities.  For social scientists, examining 
changes in platforms can help observers understand the history of parties and how they have 
changed ideologically (Gerring, 1998; Cooper, 2012; Gearan, 2016).   
A platform-writing committee is in charge of drafting the platform, which is then 
presented at the national convention and voted on by delegates.  For the GOP, the committee is 
usually chaired by a few politicians, and then each state and territory sends one man and one 
woman to make up the full committee.  In 2016, Wyoming Senator John Barrasso was chair, and 
Oklahoma Governor Mary Fallin and North Carolina Congresswoman Virginia Foxx were co-
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chairs (Lobianco, 2016).  Various state party rules govern the selection of the other members of 
the committee, who are typically unknown figures on the national stage.  For example, the 2016 
committee included a Connecticut state legislator, Kansas’s secretary of state, and the president 
of a Utah-based conservative think tank (“The Platform Committee 2016”).  These delegates are 
divided into subcommittees, such as government reform or natural resources, aided by un-elected 
committee staff.  Once the platform is drafted, a majority of the committee must vote to approve 
the platform, and then the committee presents the document to the delegates at the convention.  
These delegates may also propose and vote on changes to the document before finally ratifying it 
by a majority vote. 
But the committee does not work in isolation from other forces.  Allies of the nominee try 
to influence the direction of the platform, and for the past several decades, the Republican 
National Committee (RNC) or the platform committee itself have invited input from interest 
groups.  In 1988, the platform committee held hearings for groups to offer their opinions; one 
hearing lasted for twelve hours and featured over one hundred witnesses representing a wide 
range of special interests (Reid, 1988b; Rosenstein, Rehm & Zboril, 1988).  In 2012 and 2016, 
the RNC reached out to a variety of interest groups for their input on the platform and as a way 
to soothe tensions over Donald Trump’s controversial campaign, holding meetings with lobbyists 
representing a wide range of industries, from the American Hospital Association to the American 
Petroleum Institute, to learn about their priorities (Ackley, 2012; Restuccia & Romm, 2016).  
While the platform-writing process might not typically receive much attention from the public, 
interest groups are intensely interested.  Having one’s issue mentioned at all is valuable as a way 
to garner publicity among policymakers and the public.  If favorable changes to the platform 
occur, interest groups can use those changes as examples to their members that their cause is 
60 
 
succeeding and that the interest group is influential.  For example, in 2012, the National Rifle 
Association publicly praised the platform on its website for the platform’s gun rights language 
(Cooper, 2012).   
By forming relationships with the nominee and with key members of the Republican 
Party apparatus (sometimes even becoming part of said apparatus), Christian Right interest 
groups have helped enshrine social conservatism in the platforms.  In this chapter, I will first 
discuss how interest groups try to influence party platforms and whether or not they are 
successful, followed by examining how the Christian Right has affected platform language 
concerning Israel through content analysis and examination of media coverage.  I hypothesize 
that since 1980, Israel-related language will grow in length, that the language will begin to frame 
the relationship in moral terms instead of just geostrategic, and that the language will become 
more prominent in the document (such as by appearing earlier in the platform and by receiving 
its own section).  I conclude that while the Christian Right has been successful in promoting 
conservative stances on issues like abortion, little evidence exists to show that the Christian 
Right has influenced or even been interested in affecting Israel-related language in the manner 
hypothesized above.   
 How interest groups try to influence party platforms 
While platform committees may invite input from interest groups, groups may take little 
deliberate action to influence platforms.  Instead, an interest group may know that platform 
writers will take its wishes into account because it and its base are already influential in the 
party.  The Christian Right is a well-publicized collection of interest groups that, as previously 
discussed, have the ears of the GOP leaders, and the population that they target most for 
activism, evangelical Protestants, are a significant proportion of the country (“America’s 
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Changing,” 2015).  One might think that platform writers proactively include planks to assuage 
the Christian Right without it having to ask for it.  Thus, its influence is not recorded as the 
Christian Right instead chooses to rely on their structural power.  Structural power, and its 
complementary concept instrumental power, are two modes of influence often discussed in the 
literature related to business and politics.  An actor who takes deliberate action to influence the 
political system uses his instrumental power.  Structural power in this literature draws on the 
phenomenon of government officials adjusting their behavior in anticipation of the needs of 
business.  If policymakers believe a proposed policy will cause businesses to change their 
strategies in a way that will harm the economy, then they may shelve the policy without business 
even having to take deliberate action against it (Fuchs & Lederer, 2007; Culpepper & Reinke, 
2014; Fairfield, 2015).  
However, I do not believe that the supposed structural power of the Christian Right 
translates to unrecorded success in platforms.  The Christian Right has long been wary of being 
taken for granted by the GOP, and several prominent leaders over the years have groused that the 
GOP neglects their policies (Goodstein, 1995; Sack, 1998; Yardley, 2000; Healy, 2007).  For 
example, in the 2008 primary season, Christian Right activist Paul Weyrich and the American 
Family Association’s Donald Wildmon urged social conservatives not to compromise on 
candidates in the primary on promises of electability, especially in reference to pro-choice New 
York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani’s candidacy, with Wildmon saying: “We’ve been disappointed 
and taken for granted by Republicans at times” (as quoted in Healy, 2007).  As will be discussed 
further in this chapter, this wariness leads the Christian Right to not rely on its structural power 
being rewarded when it comes to platforms.  Numerous examples over several decades of the 
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Christian Right organizing to influence the platform point to the movement’s favoring of 
deliberate action when it comes to influencing platform writing.  
One method of influencing platforms directly goes through the nominee.   Although 
nominees do not have complete control over the platform-writing process, they often have 
significant input, and the platform committee can take significant cues from the candidate.  The 
1980 Republican platform is one good example.  Several commentators (Kaiser, 1980; “Major 
News,” 1980) noted that Reagan allies managed the platform writing process to suit Reagan, and 
the platform ultimately modeled its conservative social policy and hawkish foreign policy in part 
off his positions.  The platform included a Reagan-favored constitutional amendment to ban 
abortion, despite a majority of delegates opposing such an amendment (MacPherson, 1980b).  
Similarly, in 2000, the GOP platform took cues from George W. Bush, who wanted to appear as 
a compassionate conservative while maintaining social conservative positions.  He ended up 
leaving the convention with a platform, shaped largely by committee allies, in which he got 
much of what he wanted (Gailey, 2000; Rauber, 2000; Toner, 2000).  In the ability of the 
nominee to shape the platform, special interests can add their own voices.         
By forming a close relationship with the nominee, an interest group can pique the 
nominee’s interest in their issue.  This interest may then translate into the platform recognizing 
the issue, too.  However, some nominees and interest groups come out of the primary season 
estranged.  And while the nominee and the interest group may never become favorites of each 
other, they still might need each other.  The nominee needs an interest group’s funds, activists, 
and voters to win election; the interest group, in a polarized two-party system, likely cannot find 
a candidate who is both more amenable and electable.  In this more adversarial relationship, the 
interest group can negotiate with the nominee, and, for example, be allowed to affect the 
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platform in exchange for cooperation during the convention or campaign.  An example of this 
sort of appeasement of a disgruntled faction occurred in 2012 where the platform committee 
included several libertarian-minded planks in the document in an effort to placate supporters of 
Congressman and presidential candidate Ron Paul (Cooper, 2012).      
Recognizing the power of the nominee, the Christian Right has consistently tried to 
ingratiate itself with GOP standard bearers by joining their campaigns and taking time to meet 
with the nominee and the nominee’s representatives.  Beginning with the 1980 platform, the first 
opportunity that most Christian Right interest groups had to influence the process, prominent 
Christian Right leaders already had access to the highest levels of the GOP.  For example, in 
1980, the Moral Majority’s Jerry Falwell had close ties to nominee Ronald Reagan, close enough 
to counsel Reagan on his vice-presidential pick on the day Reagan chose him (Clendinen, 1980), 
and to be invited four years later to give the benediction at the Republican National Convention’s 
opening (Herbers, 1984).  At the twenty-first century’s beginning, George W. Bush, an 
evangelical himself, was close to the Christian Right.  Ralph Reed, formerly of the Christian 
Coalition, went to work for his campaign, and Bush enjoyed ties to Falwell and fellow Christian 
Right icon Pat Robertson (Dao, 2000; Keen, 2000).   
In the cases of GOP nominees who were not its natural allies -- and who it possibly 
clashed with during the primary campaign-- the Christian Right did not rebuff their advances 
once it came to the general election.  After defeating conservative Christian favorite Pat 
Robertson in the 1988 primary, George H. W. Bush promised to consult Robertson on several 
issues, hired Robertson’s campaign manager, and chose conservative darling Dan Quayle as his 
running mate (Brummer, 1988; Dionne, 1988; McCombs, Williams, & MacPherson, 1988).  
Bush went on to hold meetings with conservative leaders, and emphasized his social 
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conservative policies (Dionne, 1988).  Twenty years later, nominee John McCain, who had had a 
rocky relationship with the Christian Right (Glover, 2000), reached out to the Southern Baptist 
Convention’s Richard Land (Bumiller, 2008), chose Pentecostal Sarah Palin as his running mate, 
and met with and sent operatives to evangelical gatherings to assure them of his social 
conservative commitments (Kirkpatrick, 2008).  No candidate wants messy convention fights or 
a crumbling base in the midst of a general election; leveraging such possibilities can give an 
interest group influence on the platform.  The Christian Right especially has leverage as they 
attempt to organize the roughly quarter of the American population who identify with 
evangelical Protestantism (“America’s Changing,” 2015), a population that already tends to vote 
Republican (“Evangelicals Rally,” 2016).  
  However, interest groups can also assume power in the platform-writing process without 
relying on the nominee to endorse or acquiesce to their views.  They can try to influence leaders 
in the GOP apparatus.  Even in 1980, when the movement was still in its fledgling years, Falwell 
and other conservative Christian pastors met with the GOP chairman several times during the 
year in the lead-up to the convention in order to share their priorities (Clendinen, 1980).  
Becoming part of the apparatus, including part of the platform committee, is another method that 
has become a favorite of Christian Right activists as they try to influence the platform.  Twenty-
eight of the 107-member platform drafting committee in 1992 were Christian Coalition activists 
(Walker, 1992).  In 1996, Christian Right elites (including leaders of the Christian Coalition, the 
FRC, and the Eagle Forum) formed the Coalition to Keep the Republican Party Pro-Life, which 
claimed a majority of the members on the platform subcommittee overseeing abortion (Edsall & 
Claiborne, 1996).  At the 2000 and 2004 conventions, even as the Bush campaign shut out 
Christian Right representatives from the primetime coverage they had enjoyed at previous 
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conventions, social conservatives maintained a significant presence in internal workings 
(Benedetto, 2000; Toner, 2000; Simpson, 2004; White, 2004).  Even more recently, at the 2012 
and 2016 conventions, Tony Perkins, the president of a leading Christian Right interest group, 
the Family Research Council, has represented Louisiana on the platform committee, and in 2016 
on the subcommittee responsible for drafting the party’s stance on social issues (Easley, 2016). 
Are interest groups successful in influencing the platform? 
The various methods mentioned above have all been used by Christian Right interest 
groups to try to influence the GOP platform.  And one can find through media reports and 
content analysis of the platforms themselves that the Christian Right has met with success by 
using these methods, particularly on social issues.  However, as will be further discussed, little 
evidence exists that points to similar interest or success on language related to Israel.      
In 1988, George H. W. Bush made peace with conservatives partly by allowing them to 
keep intact most of the 1984 platform, a very conservative document (Dionne, 1988).  Four years 
later, he agreed to let platform committee members allied with the Christian Coalition have 
significant say, especially on social issues, again leading to a very conservative platform.  For 
example, George H. W. Bush’s stated position on abortion allowed for exceptions in the case of 
rape or incest, but the platform followed Christian Right demands and included no such caveats 
(Apple, 1992; Berry, 1992; Rosenbaum, 1992; Walker, 1992).  In 2008, in an effort to secure 
conservative support, John McCain allowed Christian Right icon and Eagle Forum founder 
Phyllis Schlafly to shape the platform and even add specific planks to it.  Despite his difficult 
relationship with the movement, McCain’s platform tended to toe the line on Christian Right 
priorities and he let them keep an uncompromising stance on abortion (against his past wishes) 
and add punitive immigration planks, too (also against his past wishes) (Kirkpatrick, 2008; 
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Simpson, 2008).  In both instances, the Christian Right provided the nominee with its 
cooperation and in exchange got to affect the GOP platform.             
As mentioned earlier, in 1996, several leaders of the Christian Right formed the Coalition 
to Keep the Republican Party Pro-Life.  This group was not just for show and ended up voting 
down proposals to water down anti-abortion language in the platform with strong majorities 
(Edsall & Claiborne, 1996). They ultimately forced nominee Bob Dole to accept a plank calling 
for a constitutional amendment to ban all abortion and with no conciliatory words for pro-choice 
Republicans (Rosenbaum, 1996).  In 2000 and 2004, although out of the limelight, conservative 
activists still were proactive in keeping strong social conservatism in the platforms (Benedetto, 
2000; Toner, 2000; Simpson, 2004; White, 2004).  The 2004 convention even saw social 
conservatives adding a plank on gay marriage that went further in opposition than President Bush 
wanted (Toner & Kirkpatrick, 2004).  During the 2016 committee-writing process, Perkins 
helped lead a successful charge to maintain socially conservative stances, routinely voting down 
more liberal proposals (Easley, 2016).       
While these examples help establish the Christian Right’s record of activism and 
influence on the platform-writing process, in the next section I plan to be more systematic in 
tracing the evolution of Israel-related language in the platform and how the Christian Right was 
involved.   
Platforms and Israel 
Examining the actual text of the platforms and how the text has changed since 1980 also 
provides evidence of Christian Right success, and corroborates media reports.  Content analysis 
is the process of getting quantitative data out of non-quantitative documents (Krippendorff, 
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2004; Gray et al., 2007; Johnson & Reynolds, 2012) and has been applied to analyze party 
platforms (Gerring, 1998). My analysis will consider several characteristics of the Israel-related 
language: (1) how many words does Israel-related policy receive; (2) what specific words frame 
the relationship (for example, does the platform treat the American-Israeli relationship purely as 
a geostrategic one or as one that also has moral import); and (3) how prominent is the Israel 
language (for example, where is it placed in the document and does it receive its own 
subsection).  Measuring these characteristics are all standard techniques in content analysis 
(Krippendorff, 2004; Gray et al., 2007).     
As a brief example of how content analysis can complement media accounts, I will 
examine language related to abortion, a previously-discussed policy area where the Christian 
Right has claimed success (MacPherson, 1980b; Walker, 1992; Edsall & Claiborne, 1996; 
Kirkpatrick, 2008; Peoples, 2016).  The 1980 platform devoted around 100 words to abortion out 
of roughly 35,000 words.  While opposing abortion and advocating for appointing pro-life 
judges, the platform still struck a conciliatory tone by recognizing opposing views within the 
party.  The next several platforms granted similar space to the issue, but dropped the recognition 
of opposing views.  The 1996 platform devoted 350 words to the issue, calling for support for 
abortion alternatives, opposing partial-birth abortion, and opposing support for services that may 
recommend abortion, and the next several platforms did much of the same.  The 2016 platform 
devoted 750 words to abortion, giving full throated endorsements to restrictions on abortion, the 
defunding of Planned Parenthood, and directly attacking Democratic abortion policies.  Just 
through a brief examination of changes in word count and how abortion policy is framed, we can 
see growing social conservatism within the GOP.   
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It is important to note that language on abortion has not grown simply because platforms 
are longer overall.  While Republican platform length has fluctuated over the past three and a 
half decades, the increasing proportion of the platform dedicated to this issue is undeniable.  For 
example, the 1980, 2000, and 2016 platforms were all within 500 words of a 35,000 word total.  
Abortion-related language grew from around one hundred words to around three hundred words 
to finally around seven hundred and fifty words.  Here one can clearly see that content analysis is 
useful in quantifying and illustrating an interest group’s influence on a platform.    
It is appropriate to examine changes in Israel-related language not only because of the 
Christian Right’s already stated interest in the issue, but also because platform language about 
foreign policy more generally has had religious undertones.  The GOP platforms portray 
America as morally unique and superior in acting on the world stage.  For example, the 1984 
platform notes “a profound moral difference between the actions and ideals of Marxist-Leninist 
regimes and those of democratic governments,” and goes on to say that America’s military 
strength serves a moral purpose.  The 1992 platform contrasts morally-blind totalitarians with the 
“shining city on a hill” that is America.  Every Republican platform since 2000 has emphasized 
the importance of religious liberty to America’s foreign policy, describing the interest as a 
“cornerstone” (2000), a “cardinal principle” (2004), a “central element” (2008), or that it 
occupies a “central place” (2012; 2016).   
As I turn to test my hypotheses specifically about Israel-related language, I am first going 
to engage in content analysis.  Following this analysis, I will examine media and scholarly 
reports to try to see if what I observe happening to Israel-related language in the platform can be 
linked to Christian Right activism.  I first hypothesized that the amount of text devoted to Israel 
would grow in the platform as the Christian Right became more influential within the GOP.  
69 
 
Figures V-1 and V-2 illustrate two different ways of measuring this trend.  Figure V-1 shows the 
number of times the word “Israel” was used in each platform.  Figure V-2 shows the percentage 
of each platform that was devoted to Israel.  The text I considered to be “Israel-related” for figure 
two includes any text concerning Israel in the platform, whether it be their treatment at the 
United Nations, moving the American embassy to Jerusalem, helping them negotiate with the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization, or just general affirmations of American support for Israel.   
Israel has been mentioned between ten and twenty-five times since 1980.  Israel-related 
text has fluctuated between roughly 225 words (0.64 percent of the 1980 platform) and 750 
words (2.63 percent of the 1992 platform).  Overall, mentions of “Israel” and text related to 
Israel have increased since 1980, but not in a clear linear trend.  The 1992 platform was the peak 
for both of these measures, and several platforms of the twenty-first century have no higher 
proportion of Israel-related language than platforms from the 1980s.  Not only has text devoted 
to Israel not consistently increased from platform to platform, some symbolically important text 
has even been lost in recent platforms.  For example, the 2012 GOP platform deleted 
longstanding language calling for recognition of an undivided Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, 
although it was re-instated in 2016, as will be discussed later (McDonald, 2016).   
I also hypothesized that beginning with the rise of the Christian Right, the language 
concerning Israel would not just treat the relationship as a geostrategic one but as one with moral 
import.  I believe that this particular change in framing the relationship is important and can 
indicate the Christian Right influence for two reasons.  The first is that appeals to morals or 
morality can have religious undertones.  Faith is a common source of morality, and inserting 
such language into a platform can serve as a subtle recognition of the drafters’ religious 
sensibilities.  Second, geostrategically-based relationships are subject to change as geopolitics  
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Figure V-1
 
Figure V-2 
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change.  Moral relationships are not so fickle, and framing the relationship in this way would 
appeal to evangelical Christians who want to make sure the American-Israeli bond lasts until the 
end-times.   
Prior to 1980, GOP platforms had consistently mentioned support for Israel.  In 1948, the 
platform welcomed Israel’s establishment, and subsequent platforms re-affirmed support for 
Israel, but also included lines about maintaining an “impartial friendship” with both Israel and its 
Arab neighbors (1954) and encouraging Israel to negotiate with its neighbors (1960; 1972).  
Additionally, these earlier platforms recognized that America’s relationship with Israel was not 
selfless: the 1968 platform, for example, mentions that Israel is part of America’s Cold War 
calculus in stopping Soviet influence in the Middle East.  This pattern changed in 1980 when the 
platforms started recognizing an explicit moral interest in Israel.  While continuing to recognize 
Israel’s strategic importance, the 1980 platform was the first to identify American support of 
Israel as a “moral imperative.”  This dimension became a feature of Republican Party platforms 
for the next twenty years.  The 1984 platform reused the phrase “moral imperative,” 1992 
recognized a “unique moral dimension,” 1996 included the words “moral bonds,” and 2000 
discussed America’s “moral concern” and its “moral obligation” to move the American embassy 
from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.  However, 2000 is also the last platform to frame the relationship in 
such a way.  The platforms of 2004 and 2008 have no such language, and 2012 and 2016 
recognize that American support for Israel comes in part from shared values, but not an explicit 
moral interest.  I have been unable to find any particular reporting on why this shift in 
terminology occurred, either to explain the introduction of such language in 1980 or to explain 
the loss of such language in the twenty-first century.        
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Lastly, I hypothesized that Israel-related language would become more prominent in the 
platform by receiving its own subsection and by becoming one of the first issues to be addressed 
within the platform’s foreign policy section.  The GOP platform committee has tended to 
relegate the foreign policy section to the end of the document.  Only in the 2004 and 2008 
platforms was foreign policy the first substantive section, unsurprising in the wake of 9/11 and 
the war on terror. In all the other platforms since 1980, foreign policy and defense concerns came 
last.  Within this section, text related to Israel has tended to be a part of a subsection headed 
along the lines of “The Middle East” (1984) or “The Middle East and Persian Gulf” (2000).  The 
platform committee has not privileged this subsection within the document. It has usually been 
placed in the middle or near the end of the foreign policy section, and thus at the end of the 
document.  Within the Middle East subsection, Israel-related language has at times come first 
(i.e. 1988), but has also been near the subsection’s end (i.e. 2004) with no clear trend over time.   
The 2008 platform marks the beginning of Israel’s own dedicated subsection.  Spaced 
separately from other Middle East policy and with the simple header of “Israel,” this language 
does enjoy a bit more prominence than it had in previous platforms.  The 2012 and 2016 
platforms are similar, although Israel language now has the heading, “Our Unequivocal Support 
of Israel.”  While it does have its own subsection, this text still has been in the middle or near the 
end of the foreign policy section.  Thus, a mixed record exists in regards to Israel-related 
language receiving increased prominence.  The placement of the foreign policy section dictates 
the general placement of Israel-related language, but even within this section the language does 
not receive much priority as it tends to be in the middle or end.  Recent platforms have given it 
its own subsection, a small victory, but based on its position within the document, Israel certainly 
does not seem a priority.  
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The results of my content analysis do not support some of my hypotheses.  The 
proportion of the platform dedicated to Israel-related language has not consistently grown since 
1980, and since 2000 the relationship has not been deemed one of moral import.  For the 
hypotheses that content analysis did not strike down, explicit influence of Christian Right interest 
groups on this portion of the platform is difficult to find.  I began searching for evidence of 
Christian Right influence by examining newspaper coverage of the platform-writing process 
beginning a few months prior to the convention and ending in the weeks following the 
convention, especially focusing on the coverage provided by The New York Times, The 
Washington Post, and The Los Angeles Times, three national newspapers of record.  I also 
examined the websites of leading Christian Right and Christian Zionist interest groups (I focused 
on Christians United for Israel, the Family Research Council, the Faith and Freedom Coalition, 
Concerned Women for America, and the Eagle Forum) for blog posts and press releases 
concerning GOP platforms.  These newspapers and these websites had no explicit reporting on 
these organizations or any other Christian Right group influencing Israel-related language.  
While some of these organizations praised the platform and compared aspects of the GOP 
platform to the Democratic (including sections on Israel), I could find no group claiming 
responsibility for shaping Israel-related language.  It is intriguing that the first platform (1980) to 
frame support for Israel in moral terms is also the first platform to be written after the formation 
of the Christian Right (and after Jerry Falwell and other Christian Right leaders emphasized that 
they cared about more than traditional social issues, and were interested in ensuring that support 
for Israel remained a core part of GOP policy (Clendinen, 1980)).  It is also intriguing that the 
high point of Israel-related language in GOP platforms was in 1992, the same year that the 
Christian Right had significant influence and perhaps the most visibility ever on the platform and 
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during the convention (Mydans, 1992; von Drehle, 1992; Benedetto, 2000; White, 2004).  But 
these are ultimately only coincidences.   
The relative silence regarding the Christian Right and Israel language in GOP platforms 
is meaningful.  The Christian Right has not been shy about claiming victory in platform language 
over the past few decades, as referenced earlier.  I see no reason why members of the Christian 
Right would not crow over their influence on text related to Israel if they had any influence when 
they have a record of doing so on planks related to abortion, for example.  From this I conclude 
that for much of my period of interest the Christian Right did not prioritize (or perhaps even 
ignored) shaping platform language on Israel.       
However, a sudden assertion of Christian Right and Christian Zionist influence did 
appear in the 2016 platform.  In adopting a conservative platform, the platform committee 
removed potential language discussing a two-state solution for Israel and reinstated language 
calling for an undivided Jerusalem (Kopan, 2016; McDonald, 2016).  The word count jumped to 
over 300 words, and in making these changes several commentators noted the importance of 
evangelical input.  Delegates and leaders of groups hoping to influence the platform noted that 
groups such as the Hispanic Israel Leadership Coalition, CUFI, and the CUFI Action Fund were 
key players in deciding this language.  Unhappy with the 2012 platform’s treatment of Israel, 
these groups were especially interested in shaping the 2016 document.  Gary Bauer, head of the 
CUFI Action Fund and a long-time influential social conservative, sent a letter to the platform 
committee asking for specific changes such as the ones mentioned above.  Additionally, Bauer 
and other interested groups reached out to Donald Trump’s staff and successfully drew their 
attention to helping change the platform language.  This combination of piquing the nominee’s 
interest and approaching the committee directly paid off and Christian Zionists celebrated the 
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acceptance of their desired changes (Kornbluh, 2016; McDonald, 2016; Mitchell, 2016; Savage, 
2016).  Israel-language finally became a target of interest groups, and 2016 saw Christian 
Zionists mount a successful lobbying campaign to ensure that the document reflected their 
interests.  The question is if this will be a one-time phenomenon, or if it will become a trend.   
Over the past three decades, Christian Right interest groups have not been explicitly 
linked to evolving platform language on Israel.  While language concerning Israel has received 
its own subsections in recent years, content analysis proves that the amount of text has not 
consistently grown, and that the American-Israeli relationship is no longer framed as an 
explicitly moral one.  A dearth of explicit evidence about Christian Right involvement makes 
drawing any solid conclusion about their influence impossible.  However, the silence on this 
issue from the normally self-promoting Christian Right indicates that it has not been a priority.  
The relatively recent rise of CUFI and similar groups may be changing this situation as 
evidenced by 2016 events, but only future platforms will tell. 
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VI. Evangelicalism and Congressional Votes 
In this chapter, I turn from presidential campaigns and platforms to members of 
Congress.  The general question is whether or not being evangelical affects a member of 
Congress’s voting habits on Israel.  My hypothesis is that an evangelical member of Congress is 
more likely to take a pro-Israel stance on legislation than is a non-evangelical.  To test this 
hypothesis, I have selected two congressional votes: the 1981 congressional referendum on the 
US selling Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) surveillance planes to Saudi 
Arabia, and the 2015 congressional referendum on the nuclear deal with Iran (see appendix 3 for 
finding sources to the full rollcall votes).  These are good cases to select because neither of them 
was explicitly about Israel; votes explicitly about Israel tend to be symbolic and receive nearly 
unanimous support.  For example, the House in 1996 unanimously passed a resolution 
condemning terrorist attacks in Israel (House Concurrent Resolution 149); in 2010, the House 
passed legislation to support Israel’s missile defense system on a four hundred and ten to four 
vote (House Resolution 5327); the Senate has passed several bills about Israel with unanimous 
consent, meaning there was such general agreement that a rollcall vote was unnecessary (Senate 
Resolution 923 in 1999, for example); and with unanimous rollcall votes (Senate Concurrent 
Resolution 4 in 1991, for example).  The two votes I selected were much more contentious, and 
although not explicitly about America’s relationship about Israel, how the legislation would 
supposedly affect Israel was an important part of debate.   
 The 1981 vote (House Concurrent Resolution 194 and Senate Concurrent Resolution 37) 
concerned the proposed arms sale of military hardware, AWACS planes, by the US to Saudi 
Arabia.  While ostensibly about Saudi-American relations, this sale generated a lot of concern for 
Israel.  Examining the text of speeches senators gave on the day of the vote, one finds many 
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examples of members mentioning Israel’s security as one of their reasons to oppose the sale.  
Missouri Senator John Danforth (R) argued against the sale, saying in part that the new hardware 
could embolden Arab states wanting to harm Israel.  Massachusetts Senator Ted Kennedy (D) 
feared that if Arab states went to war with Israel, Saudi Arabia would be pressured to join the 
war and use this hardware against Israel.  Even senators who supported the sale recognized the 
need to address concerns that the sale would jeopardize Israeli security.  For example, Arizona 
Senator Barry Goldwater, South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond, and Texas Senator John 
Tower (all Republicans) emphasized that they believed that the sale of AWACS presented no 
credible threat to Israel (“Senate,” 1981).  The Christian Right, even in its nascent stage, voiced 
opposition to the sale.  The Moral Majority’s Jerry Falwell lobbied members of Congress to 
oppose the sale and he joined Christians for American Security, a coalition formed to oppose the 
sale.  Falwell argued that America should not do anything that could potentially jeopardize 
Israel’s security, and the sale of AWACs did just that (Goshko, 1981; Kreiter, 1981).  In an 
appearance on one talk show, Falwell largely disregarded questions on abortion and school 
prayer, asking the moderator to let him discuss the AWACS (McGrory, 1981).  Members of the 
Reagan administration alleged that Falwell received a list of senators supporting the sale from 
Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin (Shipler, 1981), presumably to help Falwell lobby those 
senators.  Begin did his own lobbying, meeting with President Ronald Reagan and urging him to 
drop the sale.  Begin argued that the sale would decrease Israel’s military superiority over its 
Arab neighbors, and that the Saudis could only want these planes to use against Israel 
(Claiborne, 1981; Montgomery, 1981).   
 The 2015 vote (House Resolution 3461 and Senate Amendment 2640 on House Joint 
Resolution 61) concerned the agreement the United States and several other countries negotiated 
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with Iran about Iran’s nuclear ambitions.  Just like the arms sale to Saudi Arabia, this proposed 
policy generated a lot of discussion about how it would impact Israel among American and 
Israeli politicians, and among the Christian Right.  The day the Senate voted on the Iran deal, 
opponents warned of grave implications for Israeli security.  Utah Senator Orrin Hatch (R) 
warned that the deal would not stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapon that could be used to 
kills Israelis and Americans; South Carolina’s Lindsay Graham (R) emphasized that this 
agreement would jeopardize Israeli security; Indiana’s Dan Coats (R) and Kansas’s Pat Roberts 
(R) both reminded the audience that Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei had called for Israel’s 
destruction (“Senate,” 2015).  Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke before a joint 
session of Congress and called for members to oppose the agreement, saying if they do not then 
Israel’s existence would be threatened (Baker, 2015).    
Leading Christian Right and Christian Zionist interest groups mobilized months, even 
years, in advance in an effort to stop the deal.  The best example of the breadth of interest among 
the conservative Christian community is the formation of American Christian Leaders for Israel.  
This group wrote a petition statement in opposition to the Iran deal that included the signatures 
of the leaders of Christians United for Israel (CUFI), the Family Research Council (FRC), 
Concerned Women for America (CWA), Focus on the Family, the Christian Coalition of 
America (CCA), the Traditional Values Coalition, the Christian Broadcasting Network, and the 
Moody Bible Institute to name just a few (“Iran Statement,” 2015).  In addition to this petition, 
many of these groups and others engaged in their own extensive lobbying and grassroots 
mobilization to oppose the deal.  CUFI published a list of ten reasons to oppose the deal, calling 
on its members to urge their members of Congress to oppose the deal (CUFI claims that tens of 
thousands of members subsequently made such contacts) (Cohen, 2015; Labott et al., 2015).  At 
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its annual summit, CUFI founder John Hagee railed against the deal and organized thousands of 
summit participants to meet personally with their members of Congress in Washington, D. C. 
(Parke, 2015).  The FRC’s Tony Perkins led several members of Congress to Israel and arranged 
a meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu to discuss Israel’s opposition to the nuclear agreement 
years before Congress even voted on it (Stanley, 2013).  In the months leading up to the vote, the 
FRC’s website featured numerous posts opposing the deal with Tony Perkins’ blog celebrating 
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech to Congress and calling the Iran deal a 
historic mistake (Perkins, 2015a; Perkins, 2015b).  The FRC also provided links and text of 
articles written by senior FRC fellows who called for passionate opposition to the deal, and 
claimed the deal was even worse than the Munich appeasement of German leader Adolf Hitler 
(Blackwell & Morrison, 2015a; Blackwell & Morrison, 2015b).  CWA’s website also published 
pieces opposing the Iran deal.  CWA President Penny Nance specifically framed the deal as bad 
for Israel, arguing, for example, that the lifting of sanctions on Iran would give Iran more money 
to fund terrorists targeting Israel (Ballew, 2015).  Nance also helped organize a rally against the 
deal that included presidential candidates Donald Trump and Texas Senator Ted Cruz as 
speakers (“CWA National,” 2015).  Focus on the Family President Jim Daly authored a post on 
his organization’s website after Netanyahu’s speech, calling it Churchillian in its warning of “the 
grave threat posed by a potentially nuclear-tipped Iran” (Daly, 2015).  CCA’s President Roberta 
Combs, in an action alert directed at members, said that the deal threatened Israeli safety and that 
they should contact their members of Congress and tell them to oppose it (Combs, 2015).  Other 
posts on the Coalition’s website also mentioned how this deal endangered Israel (“House 
Majority,” 2015).  Eagle Forum sent out an action alert to members and told them to contact their 
members of Congress to oppose the deal (“Congress’s August,” 2015).  Eagle Forum President 
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Phyllis Schlafly authored a post branding the Iran deal as unconstitutional and a betrayal of 
America (Schlafly, 2015).   
Constructing the Models 
 These contentious votes provide an opportunity to test whether or not a member’s 
evangelicalism impacts their voting behavior when it comes to Israel.  The independent variable 
of interest is a dummy variable that indicates whether or not a member belongs to a Protestant 
denomination with evangelical theology (“1” is for evangelicals; “0” for non-evangelicals)(see 
appendix 4 for sources of members’ religions).  Admittedly, scholars disagree over how best to 
classify someone as evangelical based on their denominational affiliation or on their specific 
theological beliefs.  For example, Wilcox (1992) argues that denominational classifications are 
not adequate, and that individuals should be considered evangelical based on their interpretation 
of the Bible and whether or not they consider themselves born-again.  However, no 
comprehensive survey of members of Congress has captured their views on the Bible or their 
born-again status, but members do report their religious denomination.  Therefore, I rely on 
Steensland et al.’s (2000) oft-cited article in which the authors classify various Protestant 
denominations as evangelical or mainline based on their theology.   
I have made a few additional judgment calls pertaining to my coding that I must note.  
First, Steensland et al. (2000) distinguish between black Protestantism and evangelical 
Protestantism based on theological differences, and other articles note that black Protestants and 
white Protestants tend to behave differently in politics (Lipka, 2016).  Second, some members of 
Congress identify only as “Protestant” or “Christian.”  Steensland et al. (2000) classify such non-
denominational respondents as evangelical as long as they attend church services at least once a 
month.  For these particular members, I have tried to find more information about their religious 
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beliefs (see appendix 5 for sources for select members with more available information).  For 
example, Louisiana Senator Bill Cassidy identifies as Christian, and his official website notes 
that he attends the Chapel on the Campus congregation in Baton Rouge.  The Chapel on the 
Campus’s website promotes beliefs in the inerrancy of the Bible and becoming born-again, both 
indicative of evangelical theology.  Thus I coded Senator Cassidy as evangelical.  However, for 
some members, I could find no further discussion of their religion.  Because of these two issues, 
I created two different variables for a member’s evangelicalism.  In the first variable, I code 
black members of Congress who identify as Baptist, for example, as non-evangelical because of 
the previously mentioned theological differences, and I code members where I could find no 
further discussion of their faith as non-evangelical, too, because I do not know about their church 
attendance.  In the second variable measuring evangelicalism, if I had any doubts about a 
member’s faith -- for example, a black Baptist representative or a senator who identifies only as 
Protestant -- then I simply dropped them from the analysis altogether instead of presuming their 
evangelical or non-evangelical status.  The difference between these variables did not lead to 
different outcomes in the statistical analysis so, for brevity, I will only discuss the results 
generated by the first of these two variables.   
 Informed by past studies of legislators’ voting decisions (Davis & Porter, 1989; 
Richardson & Munger, 1990; Snyder, 1992; Berry et al., 2010), I have included several other 
independent variables to control for other reasons why members may vote the way they do.  
Such variables include party identification and measures of a member’s economic, social, and 
foreign policy ideology.  For the AWACS vote, I use National Journal’s 1982 measures of 
legislators’ conservatism in economic, social, and foreign policy ideology (these are three 
separate measures each drawing on different votes), and the American Security Council’s (a 
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hawkish think tank) National Security Index’s 1982 ratings of congressional members as controls 
(see appendix 6 for sources for all interest group ratings).  The National Journal ratings draw on 
a select group of roll call votes (chosen by surveying the rated votes of other interest groups and 
input from several media organizations covering Congress) over these different issue areas.  
After compiling members’ voting records, National Journal gave each one a composite score and 
rank-ordered the members compared to each other.  For example, the ultimate foreign policy 
score for Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker of Tennessee (68) indicates that he is more 
conservative than 68 percent of the Senate in this area.  I used the National Journal’s 1982 
measure instead of its 1981 scores because the 1981 score was based partly on a member’s 
AWACS vote.  Using the 1981 measure would therefore have biased the results.  The 1982 
foreign policy measure factors in a member’s vote on issues such as Cuban expansion; funding 
and procuring certain missiles; and stopping loans to Poland.  The National Security Index also 
uses rollcall votes to generate its ratings, including developing and procuring missiles and 
aircraft, a nuclear freeze, and aid to El Salvador and Chile.   
For the 2015 vote, neither National Journal nor the American Security Council has 
continued to rate members of Congress this recently, so I chose new control variables.  The 
interest group ratings that I used as controls came from Family Research Council Action (FRC’s 
political action committee that tracks a member’s behavior on social policy), the Club for 
Growth (CFG, a conservative interest group that promotes fiscal conservatism and free market 
capitalism), Peace Action (a dovish think tank that promotes less defense spending and nuclear 
non-proliferation) and the Center for Security Policy (CSP, a hawkish think tank that promotes a 
philosophy of “peace through strength”).  All of these think tanks generate their scores based off 
rollcall votes.  I found that the two foreign policy ideology control variables, generated from 
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2016 calendar year votes, while not including the vote on the Iranian nuclear deal itself, did 
include related votes designed to make the terms of the deal impossible to carry out.  For 
example, Peace Action’s Senate ratings considered a vote preventing the buying of heavy water 
from Iran.  CSP’s House ratings considered votes preventing buying heavy water, and a vote 
imposing sanctions on Iran.  Including these particular votes would bias the model.  I therefore 
edited the two groups’ scores and removed the Iran-related votes from calculation as I re-scored 
members.  I found that using the original score and the edited score caused no substantive change 
in my independent variable of interest, but to avoid bias, I will only discuss the results of models 
that used the edited ratings.  I also no longer include a party identification variable.  The 
unanimity among Republican members of Congress in opposing the deal caused the probit and 
logit models to drop this variable from the analysis.  I cannot fix this lack of variation among 
GOP members of Congress, so I proceeded without this variable.    
AWACS for Saudi Arabia 
When conducting statistical analysis of each vote, I created logit and probit models 
because they are designed to work with binary dependent variables such as Yes/No votes in 
Congress.  Because logit models and probit models using the same variables will report almost 
identical levels of statistical significance between independent and dependent variables, and will 
indicate the same directions for relationships between independent and dependent variables, I 
will just discuss my probit models.  The AWACS legislation was written as a measure of 
disapproval of the sale.  If a member voted “aye,” they were voting against the sale and thus 
taking the “pro-Israel” stance.  According to my hypothesis and based on my coding of the 
variables, I expect evangelicalism to have a direct relationship with this vote (i.e., evangelicals 
should vote “aye”).  I ran three separate regressions, one for the House vote, one for the Senate 
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vote, and one where I combined the two chambers’ votes (figures 1-3; all figures can be found at 
the end of this chapter).  Not every member of Congress is included in these regressions, because 
some failed to report any religious status at all, and thus I left them out of the analysis altogether. 
Out of the members of the 1981 House whose religion I could code, thirty-three, ten 
percent of the sample, qualified as evangelical.  Fifteen of these evangelicals, or forty-five 
percent, opposed the sale.  Evangelicals were less likely to oppose the sale than non-
evangelicals, seventy-six percent of whom opposed the sale.  One finds this same phenomenon in 
the Senate.  Twelve senators were evangelical (thirteen percent of all senators I could code), and 
only two of them (seventeen percent of evangelical senators) opposed the deal.  In contrast, fifty-
one percent of non-evangelical senators opposed the deal.  These initial comparisons greatly 
increase my skepticism regarding my hypothesis that evangelicals will be more likely than non-
evangelicals to oppose the sale.        
In the probit model, no independent variables had a statistically significant relationship 
with the House vote (measured at the standard α level of .05).  If one is a little more generous 
than .05, then three variables approach statistical significance.  The measure of a member’s 
cultural conservatism has a coefficient of -.013 and an α level of .057, indicating that the more 
culturally conservative a member was, the more likely a member was to support the sale.  The 
National Security Index had a coefficient of -.012 and an α level of .062, indicating that more 
hawkish members were more likely to support the sale.  Lastly, the relationship between the vote 
and evangelicalism nears statistical significance (α=.064).  However, the direction of this 
relationship runs counter to the original hypothesis.  With a coefficient of -.467, the inverse 
relationship indicates that evangelicals were more likely than non-evangelicals to support the 
sale.  It is not easy to think of a credible causal mechanism that explains why evangelicalism 
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would push a member towards selling arms to Saudi Arabia is.  It appears that, consistent with 
my findings in previous chapters, Christian Right ties and evangelicalism do not always lead to 
pro-Israel activity.    
In the probit model for the Senate vote, three variables were statistically significant at 
the.05 level: National Journal’s economic measure (α=.049), cultural measure (α=.003), and 
foreign policy measure (α=.027).  The first two of these variables had negative coefficients, 
indicating that as members became more conservative, they were more likely to support the sale.  
The foreign policy variable had a positive coefficient, indicating that more hawkish senators 
were more likely to oppose the sale.  In short, ideology mattered.  Evangelicalism did not have a 
statistically significant relationship (α=.167) with support for the sale, but its coefficient (-.981) 
again indicated that evangelicals were more likely to support the sale.   
In the probit model of the entire Congress, three variables achieved statistical 
significance: evangelicalism (α=.010), party identification (α=.010), and National Journal’s 
cultural measure (α=.000).  The National Security Index almost reached statistical significance 
(α=.068).  All these relationships were inverse.  Evangelicals, Republicans, cultural 
conservatives, and hawkish members were all more likely to support the sale than their 
counterparts.  None of my models for the AWACS vote supported my hypothesis.  In fact, 
evangelicals seem more likely, if anything, to support selling the hardware than non-
evangelicals.   
Why might evangelical members of Congress not have responded to the calls of their 
religious brethren?  One reason might be that evangelical activists, despite their public 
opposition to the sale, did little actual arm-twisting.  Despite Jerry Falwell’s public statements 
against the deal, several senators who had enjoyed the support of the Moral Majority supported 
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the sale: North Carolina’s John East, Colorado’s William Armstrong, and Iowa’s David Jepsen 
are all examples (McGrory, 1981).  Members of the Israeli government privately complained that 
Falwell did nothing substantive to oppose the deal (Shipler, 1981).  Several senators even went 
from being prominent opponents of the sale to supporting it.  Jepsen is perhaps the most 
disheartening defector from the standpoint of a Christian Zionist.  Previously declaring his 
opposition to the sale because he thought it was anti-Israel, Jepsen ended up voting for it, citing 
constituent pressure and classified information (McGrory, 1981; Mohr, 1981a).  Other defectors 
included Maine Senator William Cohen, who said he did not want to handicap Reagan in 
international affairs and that the failure of the sale would be blamed on Israel (Mohr, 1981b).  
Washington’s Slade Gorton, an evangelical, told the press a letter from Reagan caused him 
ultimately to support the sale (Mohr, 1981b).  It appears that the Reagan administration lobbied 
far harder and more successfully than the Christian Right by revising language in the deal to fit 
the demands of senators and promising to hold off on delivering the equipment for several years.  
Senator John Glenn implied in the wake of the vote that the administration’s lobbying methods 
were not all made up of such carrots, remarking that Reagan was “ill-served by a staff that uses 
methods like these” (as quoted in Mohr, 1981b).  However, party identification was only 
statistically significant in the model of the entire Congress; the other two models do not indicate 
that Republicans felt particular loyalty to Republican President Reagan’s vision on this vote as 
one might expect.  The AWACS vote remains puzzling, but if anything, these models indicate 
that evangelicals were more likely to support the sale than non-evangelicals.     
 The Iran Nuclear Deal           
I again worked with probit models in my examination of the Iran nuclear deal.  I coded 
my data similarly to how I coded the AWACS data in that I expect evangelicalism to have a 
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direct relationship with opposition to the Iran deal.  I ran three separate regressions, one for the 
House vote, one for the Senate vote, and one where I combined the two chambers’ votes (figures 
4-6).  Not every member of Congress is included in these regressions, because some failed to 
report any religious status at all or because they did not participate in enough congressional votes 
to receive interest groups ratings, and thus I left them out of the analysis altogether. 
At first glance, the 2015 vote seems to offer better support for the main hypothesis in this 
chapter than the 1981 vote. Sixty-four House members (fifteen percent) qualified as evangelical, 
and fifty-nine (or 92%) of evangelical representatives took the pro-Israel position and opposed 
the deal.  Only 57 percent of non-evangelical representatives opposed the deal.  There were 
thirteen evangelicals in the Senate (thirteen percent), and of these twelve of them (92%) opposed 
the deal.  Fifty-three percent of non-evangelical senators opposed the deal.     
In the probit model, only one variable had a statistically significant relationship with the 
House vote (measured at the standard α level of .05).  Peace Action’s rating had a coefficient of  
-.011 and an α level of .025, indicating that the more dovish a member is the more likely he or 
she is to support the sale.  If one is a little more generous than .05, then CSP’s variable also 
approaches statistical significance (α=.054), and with a coefficient of .012 indicates that the more 
hawkish a member is, the more likely he or she is to oppose the deal.  The relationship between 
the vote and evangelicalism is not close to statistical significance (α=.341).  Additionally and 
oddly, the direction of this relationship runs counter to the original hypothesis.  With a 
coefficient of -.829, the inverse relationship indicates that, if anything, evangelicals were more 
likely than non-evangelicals to support the deal.  This contrasts with my expectations from 
theory and from the proportions mentioned above, and it is not easy to think of a credible causal 
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mechanism that explains why evangelicalism would push a member towards supporting the 
Iranian nuclear deal.   
In the probit model for the Senate vote, the statistical software had difficulty constructing 
a model when using both foreign policy ideology controls.  The Senate vote in particular might 
be troublesome for the statistical software because evangelical senators were almost unanimous 
in their opposition to the deal (only one of thirteen supported it).  This variable’s lack of 
variation in relation to the dependent variable could have created a problem similar to the one 
caused by the party identification variable.  I was still able to generate a model using Peace 
Action’s rating as my only foreign policy control variable, and while I would like to have 
avoided this inconsistency, it does not affect my conclusion.  No variables are close to 
approaching statistical significance.  Evangelicalism had an α value of .937, and its coefficient (-
2.335) again indicates that evangelicals were more likely to support the deal.   
In the probit model of the entire Congress, one variable achieved statistical significance: 
FRC’s rating (α=.031).  With a coefficient of .026, the more socially conservative a member is, 
the more likely they are to oppose the deal.  The ratings from Peace Action (α=.094) and CSP 
(α=.079) approach statistical significance.  Their coefficients (-.007 and .010, respectively) 
indicate the same relationships they did in the House probit model.  The evangelical variable is 
statistically insignificant (α=.387), and its coefficient (-.747) again indicates an inverse 
relationship.  Examining these three regressions, it appears that, if anything, ideology mattered.  
None of my models for the Iran vote supported my hypothesis.  In fact, evangelicals seem more 
likely, if anything, to support the deal than non-evangelicals based off these models.   
 Despite all the recorded work of Christian Right interest groups to mobilize evangelical 
opposition to the Iran deal, using these regressions, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
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relationship between evangelicalism and the vote is due to chance.   I am surprised by this, and 
the indicated direction of this relationship, especially because Christian Right and Christian 
Zionist groups inserted themselves into the Iran deal debate, even years prior to the actual vote, 
to make their opposition to it known.  In selecting these two votes, I chose “easy” cases, in that I 
expected to find support for my hypothesis given how clearly the “pro-Israel” choice was 
distinguished, and the amount of conservative Christian activism in relation to the votes.  The 
failure of these cases to support my hypothesis indicates that it is likely wrong for a wider array 
of cases (Gerring, 2007).  It appears that, consistent with my findings in previous chapters, 
Christian Right ties and evangelicalism do not always lead to pro-Israel activity, no matter if the 
year is 1981 or 2015.    
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Note: probit models are maximum likelihood estimators, which use observations to generate the 
parameters of a statistical model.  The statistical program begins this process by generating 
iterations.  The first iteration (Iteration 0) includes none of the independent variables to create a 
“null” model.  Subsequent iterations include the independent variables, and the model attempts 
to find the best fit, represented by maximizing the log likelihood.  Maximizing this likelihood is 
the process of estimating the best values for the independent variables’ coefficients. When the 
difference between successive iterations becomes almost zero, the model is said to have 
converged, and stops further iterations.          
 
Model 1: 1981 House Vote on AWACS Probit Model 
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -194.660 
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -144.793 
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -141.880 
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -141.854 
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -141.854 
 
 
Probit regression  Number of observations = 331 
   LR chi2(4) = 105.61 
Log likelihood = -141.854  Prob > chi2 = 0.000 
   Pseudo R2 = 0.271 
 
 
 
AWACS Vote Coefficient Std. Error z P>|z| 95% Confidence Interval 
         
Evangelical  -0.475    0.257        -1.85    0.064          -0.978            0.028 
Party  -0.356    0.219        -1.63               0.103          -0.785             0.073 
NJ Economic Conservatism   -0.004 0.006 -0.70 0.484 -0.016            0.008 
NJ Foreign Policy 
Conservatism  0.005 0.007 0.08 0.937 -0.013  0.014 
NJ Cultural Conservatism  -0.013 0.007 -1.90 0.057  -0.026  0.000 
NSI Rating  -0.012 0.006 -1.86 0.062 -0.024  0.001 
Constant  3.025 0.376 8.04 0.000 2.288  3.763 
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Model 2: 1981 Senate Vote on AWACS Probit Model 
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -66.354 
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -29.536 
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -29.343 
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -29.342 
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -29.342 
 
 
Probit regression  Number of observations = 96 
   LR chi2(4) = 74.02 
Log likelihood = -29.342 Prob > chi2 = 0.000 
   Pseudo R2 = 0.558 
 
 
 
AWACS Vote Coefficient Std. Error z P>|z| 95% Confidence Interval 
         
Evangelical  -0.981    0.709        -1.38    0.167          -2.371            0.409 
Party  -0.162    0.713        -0.23               0.820          -1.559             1.234 
NJ Economic Conservatism   -0.036 0.018 -1.97 0.049 -0.071  -0.000 
NJ Foreign Policy 
Conservatism  0.032 0.015 2.21 0.027 -0.004  -0.061 
NJ Cultural Conservatism  -0.035 0.012 -2.94 0.003 -0.058  -0.012 
NSI Rating  -0.015 0.012 -1.32 0.187 -0.038  0.007 
Constant  3.156 0.857 3.68 0.000 1.476  4.836 
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Model 3: 1981 Congressional Vote on AWACS Probit Model 
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -271.560 
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -194.486 
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -191.973 
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -191.968 
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -191.968 
 
Probit regression  Number of observations = 427 
   LR chi2(4) = 159.18 
Log likelihood = -191.968 Prob > chi2 = 0.000 
   Pseudo R2 = 0.293 
 
 
 
AWACS Vote Coefficient Std. Error z P>|z| 95% Confidence Interval 
         
Evangelical  -0.576    0.224        -2.58    0.010          -1.015           -0.138 
Party  -0.512    0.198        -2.59               0.010          -0.899            -0.125 
NJ Economic Conservatism   -0.006 0.005 -1.19 0.235 -0.016  0.004 
NJ Foreign Policy 
Conservatism  0.008 0.006 1.40 0.163 -0.003  0.019 
NJ Cultural Conservatism  -0.019 0.005 -3.67 0.000 -0.029  0.009 
NSI Rating  -0.009 0.005 -1.82 0.068 -0.018  0.001 
Constant  2.880 0.299 9.64 0.000 2.294  3.466 
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Model 4: 2015 House Vote on Iran Nuclear Deal Probit Model 
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -282.424 
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -76.061 
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -65.570 
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -64.378 
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -64.233 
Iteration 5: log likelihood = -64.229 
Iteration 6: log likelihood = -64.229 
Iteration 7: log likelihood = -64.229 
 
Probit regression  Number of observations = 427 
   LR chi2(4) = 436.39 
Log likelihood = -64.229  Prob > chi2 = 0.000 
   Pseudo R2 = 0.773 
 
 
 
Iran Nuclear Deal Vote Coefficient Std. Error z P>|z| 95% Confidence Interval 
         
Evangelical  -0.829    0.870        -0.95    0.341          -2.534                    0.877 
FRC 2015 rating  0.016 0.014 1.15 0.252 -0.012  0.044 
CFG 2015 rating  0.028 0.027 1.05 0.294 -0.120  0.081 
Peace Action 2016 rating  -0.011 0.005 -2.24 0.025 -0.120  -0.001 
CSP 2016 rating  0.012 0.006 1.93 0.054 -0.120  0.025 
Constant  -0.664 0.371 -1.79 0.074 -0.456  0.063 
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Model 5: 2015 Senate Vote on Iran Nuclear Deal Probit Model 
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -68.029 
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -17.109 
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -13.771 
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -12.593 
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -12.347 
Iteration 5: log likelihood = -12.340 
Iteration 6: log likelihood = -12.340 
Iteration 7: log likelihood = -12.340 
Iteration 8: log likelihood = -12.340 
 
 
Probit regression  Number of observations = 100 
   LR chi2(4) = 111.38 
Log likelihood = -12.340  Prob > chi2 = 0.000 
   Pseudo R2 = 0.819 
 
 
 
Iran Nuclear Deal Vote Coefficient Std. Error z P>|z| 95% Confidence Interval 
         
Evangelical  -2.335  29.636        -0.08    0.937        -60.420                    55.749 
FRC 2015 rating  0.063 0.049 1.27 0.202 -0.034  0.159 
CFG 2015 rating  0.038 0.048 0.79 0.431 -0.056  0.131 
Peace Action 2016 rating  -0.004 0.009 -0.49 0.624 -0.023  0.014 
Constant  -1.503 0.502 -2.99 0.003 -2.488  -0.518 
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Model 6: 2015 Congressional Vote on Iran Nuclear Deal Probit Model 
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -350.801 
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -95.262 
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -81.857 
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -80.366 
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -80.229 
Iteration 5: log likelihood = -80.227 
Iteration 6: log likelihood = -80.227 
 
Probit regression  Number of observations = 527 
   LR chi2(4) = 541.15 
Log likelihood = -80.227  Prob > chi2 = 0.000 
   Pseudo R2 = 0.771 
 
 
 
Iran Nuclear Deal Vote Coefficient Std. Error z P>|z| 95% Confidence Interval 
         
Evangelical  -0.747    0.864        -0.87    0.387          -2.440                   0.946 
FRC 2015 rating  0.026 0.012 2.16 0.031 0.002  0.050 
CFG 2015 rating  0.021 0.020 1.07 0.283 -0.018  0.061 
Peace Action 2016 rating  -0.007 0.004 -1.67 0.094 -0.015  0.001 
CSP 2016 rating  0.010 0.006 1.76 0.079 -0.001  0.022 
Constant  -0.999 0.301 -3.32 0.001 -1.589  -0.409 
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VII. Conclusion 
The evangelical relationship with Israel is a puzzling one, as American evangelicals have 
become some of Israel’s fiercest supporters, at least superficially.  Even since the Christian 
Right’s early years, its leaders, such as Jerry Falwell, have emphasized that their policy interests 
extend beyond social conservative priorities, and include Israel (Clendinen, 1980; Falwell, 
1981).  Today, Christian Right leaders like the Family Research Council’s Tony Perkins and 
Concerned Women for America’s Penny Nance continue Israel-related activism, and the 
Christian Zionist movement has sparked the creation of interest groups dedicated solely to 
promoting Israel, such as CUFI, which claims millions of members.  Evangelical presidential 
candidates like Texas Senator Ted Cruz and Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee made their 
unquestioning commitment to Israel’s security clear during their time on the national stage.  On 
the grassroots level, evangelicals have long factored GOP presidential candidates’ stances on 
Israel into their voting calculus (Sharn, 1996; Horowitz, 2011; Wollner, 2015).   
Religion and American foreign policy have been intertwined since the nation’s founding, 
exhibited in Manifest Destiny, rationales for American imperialism, and Cold War dogma.  
Evangelicals and the Christian Right have a particularly strong theological impetus to support 
Israel.  Scripture teaches that God promised the land of Canaan to the Jewish people, and that 
God will reward those who care for Israel (Amstutz, 2014).  The existence of Israel also provides 
the best chance for the realization of the end-times, and for evangelical Christians to receive their 
celestial reward (McAlister, 2005; Amstutz, 2014).  But this investigation indicates that 
theological impetus does not translate into prioritization of shaping Israel-related language in 
platforms, bringing up Israel in debates, or siding with Israel in in congressional votes.  Amstutz 
(2014) offers other reasons why evangelicals feel a particularly strong bond with Israel, 
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including shared beliefs in democracy and human rights, and shared security concerns.  But the 
results of this investigation call into question the commitment and the effectiveness of 
evangelical presidential candidates and the Christian Right organizations that attempt to mobilize 
evangelicals when Israel-related policy is on the table. 
 The Republican Party’s platforms have changed significantly since 1980, especially as 
the party has increasingly looked to please social conservatives.  In a mixture of candidates 
acquiescing to more strident views to keep to the peace, or social conservatives taking matters 
into their own hands and writing their views into the platform, Christian Right activists have 
celebrated the adoption of their measures on topics as diverse as abortion and immigration 
reform.  Apparently, these activists’ fervor on issues like abortion has not extended to fighting 
for changes in Israel-related language.  The proportion of the platform dedicated to Israel has not 
consistently increased over the past several decades, and language designating the American-
Israeli relationship as one of moral import, instead of solely strategic value, has fallen by the 
wayside.  The Christian Right, like any collection of interest groups, has shown its eagerness to 
claim credit for its work.  The silence on Israel-related language indicates the Christian Right has 
failed to influence this part of the platform.   
 The men and women who want to run on these platforms also have the opportunity to 
prioritize Israel in the national discourse, and push the country towards new policies.  However, 
presidential candidates who are evangelical or who are seeking the support of conservative 
Christians have not uniformly prioritized the issue of Israel in their campaigns.  In debates, non-
evangelicals are more likely to bring up Israel of their own accord.  Evangelical candidates do 
not even appear to be more intense in their rhetorical support for Israel, as one finds examples of 
non-evangelicals wanting to move the American embassy to Jerusalem or championing Israel as 
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one of America’s best allies, too.  Granted, non-evangelicals are more likely than evangelicals to 
criticize Israel, advocate for less American support for Israel, or say nothing about Israel.  But 
candidates looking to curry favor with the Christian Right are also more likely to do these same 
things than those not seeking the Christian Right’s help.  Evangelical activists are interested in 
hearing about Israel, but even candidates who never deviate from unquestioning support for 
Israel do not always address this issue in their outreach to such activists.  This oversight likely 
signals that the candidates themselves are unaware of the potency of Israel among this 
community, or they believe that other issues are more important to evangelical listeners.     
 In actual policy-making, this research does not indicate that evangelicals are more likely 
to support pro-Israel legislation.  Using two contentious congressional votes, each of which drew 
significant attention for how the policies would allegedly impact Israel, probit regression models 
do not indicate that evangelical members of Congress are more likely to vote for the pro-Israel 
position.  In the 1981 vote on selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia, the independent variable 
measuring a member’s evangelical status was not consistently statistically significant, and even 
when it was, it indicated that evangelical members of Congress were actually more likely to take 
the anti-Israel position on the issue.  Despite the interest of the budding Christian Right in 
opposing the sale, members of Congress with close ties to the Moral Majority still felt safe 
supporting the sale; the Reagan administration received far more credit than Jerry Falwell in 
winning votes.  In the 2015 vote on the Iran nuclear deal, the variable measuring evangelicalism 
was never statistically significant, and its coefficient indicated that if anything, evangelical 
members of Congress were again more likely to take the anti-Israel position.  Ideology appears to 
trump religious or theological motives when it comes time to vote.   
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 Among political scientists, the literature on interest group attempts to affect American 
foreign policy remains smaller than the literature on attempts to affect domestic policy.  Past 
studies indicate that when interest groups do try to affect foreign policy decisions that they use 
much of the same strategies as interest groups focused on domestic policy.  Direct and indirect 
lobbying are both tools used by the Christian Right in their attempts to affect policy related to 
Israel.  In 1981, Jerry Falwell reportedly had a list of senators provided to him for him to call; in 
2013, Tony Perkins was already leading members of Congress on trips to Israel as part of his 
interest in opposing the Iran deal.  Grassroots mobilization occurred as well, with the 2015 Iran 
deal sparking the Christian Right to host rallies and urge their members to contact members of 
Congress.  But perhaps the literature is also smaller because groups like the Christian Right that 
have interests in domestic and foreign policy choose to focus more on the former.  Even if an 
interest group’s base is interested in different policy areas, this does not mean the interest group 
has the resources or the desire to influence every area.  The Christian Right has largely left 
Israel-related language in GOP platforms to others, earning attention instead for language 
detailing strident opposition to abortion and gay rights.  Despite demonstrated interest in courting 
conservative Christians, plenty of GOP presidential candidates do not consistently bring up Israel 
in their outreach to this community, and desire for Christian Right support does not always keep 
candidates from criticizing Israel or American policy towards it.  And evangelicals are not 
statistically significantly more likely to take pro-Israel positions in congressional votes than non-
evangelicals.  Unless the movement re-prioritizes (which is possible as will be noted later), 
Christian Right activism may not provide much new material on how interest groups affect 
American foreign policy.           
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My approach in this project did not investigate all possible paths through which 
evangelicalism or Christian Right activism could impact Israel’s position in America’s politics.  I 
examined only GOP presidential primary contests.  One could potentially find a wealth of new 
information in a study of electoral races for the House and Senate, and examine candidates’ 
stances on Israel and how that reflected their evangelicalism or interest in the Christian Right.  
Interviews with Christian Right and evangelical activists could help determine whether or not 
interest in Israel is really just lip-service among many of these individuals, and help explain why 
affecting Israel-related language and policy seems to take a backseat to issues like abortion.  
Additionally, more in-depth interviews with evangelical members of Congress (and evangelical 
staffers) and with evangelical civil servants handling Israel-related policy (such as State or 
Defense Department employees) could also provide new information on how faith and Christian 
Right activism affects policymakers’ decisions on Israel.  Future studies might also further and 
better elucidate the complexity of evangelical support for Israel by differentiating among 
evangelicals (in regards to both their theology and their political ideology) and exploring 
differing approaches to Israel within these subgroups.   
 Evangelical interest in Israel will not disappear, and with the growing influence of groups 
like Christians United for Israel (for example, the 2016 GOP platform’s Israel language was 
influenced by Christian Zionists), potential does exist for evangelical and Christian Right 
activism on Israel-related policy to shed more understanding of how interest groups and religion 
affect American foreign policy, especially in regards to a country that remains one of America’s 
most significant strategic and symbolic allies.   
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Republican Primary Debates 
 Transcripts of all evaluated debates from the 2000 campaign season on can be found 
through the University of California, Santa Barbara’s American Presidency Project: 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/debates.php 
 Referenced transcripts or video for debates from earlier campaign seasons can be found 
at the following individual locations. 
January 5, 1980 debate: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ygGL9DGeSGM&t=3157s 
April 23, 1980 debate: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YfHN5QKq9hQ 
October 28, 1987: https://www.c-span.org/video/?284-1/republican-candidate-debate 
January 8, 1988: https://www.c-span.org/video/?64-1/republican-candidates-debate 
February 19, 1988: https://www.c-span.org/video/?1604-1/republican-candidates-debate 
January 6, 1996: https://www.c-span.org/video/?69279-1/republican-presidential-debate 
January 13, 1996: https://www.c-span.org/video/?69366-1/republican-presidential-candidates-
debate 
February 15, 1996: https://www.c-span.org/video/?69949-1/new-hampshire-primary-debate 
February 22, 1996: https://www.c-span.org/video/?70099-1/republican-candidates-debate 
February 29, 1996: https://www.c-span.org/video/?70211-1/republican-candidates-forum 
March 3, 1996: https://www.c-span.org/video/?70269-1/republican-presidential-debate 
Appendix 2: Party Platforms 
 Full text of all discussed Republican Party platforms can be found through the University 
of California, Santa Barbara’s American Presidency Project: 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/platforms.php 
Appendix 3: Congressional Votes 
Record of 1981 AWACS House of Representatives vote (House Concurrent Resolution 194): 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/97-1981/h243 
Record of 1981 AWACS Senate vote (Senate Concurrent Resolution 37): 
http://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.congrec/crd1270155&id=1&size=2&collecti
on=congrec&index=congrec/crdaac (specifically page S12452 of the Senate Congressional 
Record on October 28, 1981) 
Record of 2015 Iran deal House of Representatives vote (House Resolution 3461): 
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2015/roll493.xml 
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Record of 2015 Iran Deal Senate vote (Senate Amendment 2640 on House Joint Resolution 61): 
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=114&se
ssion=1&vote=00264 
Appendix 4: sources of religious beliefs of members of Congress 
Barone, M. & Ujifusa, G. (1983). The Almanac of American Politics 1984. Washington, D. C.:  
National Journal.  
 
Cohen, R. E. & Barnes, J. (2015). The Almanac of American Politics 2016. Bethesda, MD:  
Columbia Books. 
 
Members of Congress: Religious Affiliations (2015, January 5). Pew Research Center. Retrieved  
from http://www.pewforum.org/2015/01/05/members-of-congress-religious-affiliations/ 
 
Appendix 5: additional sources for religious beliefs of members of Congress identifying as only 
Protestant or Christian for the 2015 vote on the Iran nuclear deal 
Congressman Mo Brooks: https://www.facebook.com/notes/mo-brooks/parker-griffith-attacks-
mo-brooks-with-false-push-polling/386494031463     
Senator Bill Cassidy: https://www.cassidy.senate.gov/about/about-bill 
http://thechapelbr.com/beliefs/ 
Congressman Bob Dold: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20101003141958/http://www.suntimes.com/news/politics/2755132,b
ob-dold-residency-issue-092810.article    
Congressman Richard Hudson https://hudson.house.gov/biography/#.WGQZWlzvY8w  
Congressman Randy Hultgren: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-11-03/news/ct-met-
congress-hultgren-1104-20101103_1_congressman-elect-democrat-bill-foster-law-degree   
Congressman Jim Jordan: 
http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2011/06/us_rep_jim_jordan_of_ohio_gain.html 
Congresswoman Cathy McMorris Rodgers:  https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDIR-2011-12-
01/pdf/CDIR-2011-12-01-WA-H-5.pdf   
Congresswoman Martha McSally: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/decision2012/running-for-gabrielle-giffordss-house-
seat-is-not-martha-mcsallys-first-challenge/2012/10/25/d98e42ee-1de2-11e2-ba31-
3083ca97c314_story.html 
Congressman Mark Meadows: http://meadowsforcongress.com/mark/ 
 http://www.cbchurch.org/about-cbc/affiliation--beliefs/    
Congressman Robert Pittenger:  http://www.patriotclassic.com/about2-c1jg7    
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Congressman Joe Pitts: 
http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=120746516 
Congressman Adrian Smith: http://www.omaha.com/news/rep-adrian-smith-quietly-looks-out-
for-his-district/article_2d1bda5e-76f4-574b-ad3e-69e2a60a4bc7.html    
Senator Jon Tester: http://www.nytimes.com/cq/2006/11/08/cq_1907.html 
Congresswoman Jackie Walorski: http://media.cq.com/members/31142?rc=1  
Congressman Roger Williams: 
https://books.google.com/books?id=haUIULhY0EoC&pg=PA260&lpg=PA260&dq=roger+willi
ams+university+christian+church&source=bl&ots=g2OwHZEZAg&sig=rl_Gjh74zeAJNGZi9gT
SrvLsTJQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwidstrKgJjRAhVFYyYKHWYeCdoQ6AEINTAE#v=o
nepage&q=roger%20williams%20university%20christian%20church&f=false     
Appendix 6: interest group rating sources 
1982 National Journal ratings: 
Schneider, W. (1983, May 7). How They Voted. National Journal, 15(19), 936-952.  
1982 American Security Council National Security Index rating:  
 
Barone, M. & Ujifusa, G. (1983). The Almanac of American Politics 1984. Washington, D. C.:  
National Journal.  
 
2015 Club for Growth ratings 
 House Scorecard:  
 
Congressional Scorecards. The Club for Growth.  Retrieved from 
http://www.clubforgrowth.org/scorecards/?chamber=0&scyear=2015 
  
Senate Scorecard:  
 
Congressional Scorecards. The Club for Growth. Retrieved from 
http://www.clubforgrowth.org/scorecards/?chamber=-1&scyear=2015 
 
2015 Family Research Council Action ratings:  
 
Vote Scorecard. FRC Action. Retrieved from https://www.frcaction.org/scorecard 
 
2016 Peace Action ratings:  
 
Know the Score. Peace Action. Retrieved from http://thescore.peaceactionwest.org/ 
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2016 Center for Security Policy ratings:  
 
2015-2016 Congressional National Security Scorecard. Center for Security Policy. Retrieved  
from http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2016/10/13/2015-2016-congressional-
national-security-scorecard/ 
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